U.S.-Pakistan relations, which had yet to recover from the fallout of the Raymond Davis incident in January and the killing of Bin Laden in May, are now facing another major challenge after NATO (ISAF) forces killed 24 Pakistani regular troops on November 26. The two posts that the troops were manning was located in the Mohmand Tribal area. The purpose of the two posts was to stop Pakistani Taliban militants from crossing the border. This is something that Washington has been demanding of Pakistan for some time.[1] Pakistan has responded to the incident by condemning ISAF and particularly the United States for the deaths; some Pakistanis even described the event as an unprovoked act of aggression.[2] Second, thousands have demonstrated against the United States and have demanded an end to US-Pakistan relations.[3] Third, Pakistan has asked the U.S. to withdraw from the Shamsi air base in Balochistan, believed to be a staging post for U.S. drones.[4] Fourth, Pakistan allegedly also withdrew an offer to encourage Afghan Taliban to partake in negotiations.
This latest development comes after months of speculation over a controversial memo passed by an American-Pakistani businessman Mansoor Ijaz to former American military chief Admiral Mike Mullen on May 10, 2011. The memo, which surfaced soon after the killing of Osama bin Laden, reportedly came from President Zardari via the Pakistani Ambassador to the United States at the time, Hussain Haqqani. In the memo President Zardari offered that in return for U.S. assistance he would rein in the Inter-Service Intelligence Directorate (ISI) and eliminate Section S – the body charged with maintaining relations with the Taliban, the Haqqani network and others. Zardari also offered to establish a new Pakistani national security team[5] that supposedly would be more pliable to Washington’s demands.
The reason why the memo and the killings have caused such anger within Pakistan is that ordinary Pakistanis are trying to come to terms with the way the world sees their country (a hotbed of Islamic radicalism and terrorism, without recognizing the damage caused by terrorism to Pakistan – 40,000 dead and billions lost in revenue). Pakistanis increasingly claim that radicalism and terrorism has come to their country courtesy of the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan. The view on the street is that the U.S., NATO and the Afghan government are the ones not dealing with terrorists, while the Pakistani army battles away. Lieutenant General Asif Yasin Malik, commander of the 11th Corps who is supervising the Pakistani military effort in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has declared, “We will take action against the terrorists in our area and Nato and Afghanistan should also take action against them (terrorists) in their area across the border… The Afghan government and Nato should not allow terrorists’ safe havens in Afghan provinces along the Pakistan border.”[6]
Second, over the past six months, Pakistan has had its sovereignty repeatedly violated, mainly by the United States, which has sent military forces into Pakistan to conduct operations. To a nation perpetually in fear of attack, this is a major concern, especially as U.S.-Indian relations are on the rise. Pakistanis are aware that after the T-90S debacle India is increasingly looking for new suppliers,[7] making them fearful of close U.S.-India relations.
Third, Pakistanis are frustrated with their own civilian leaders, whom they feel do not represent their interests and that of Pakistan. President Zardari’s corrupt background has remained with him, explaining his low popularity rating. The debate over the 2007 National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) has only heightened such perceptions as the country remains in turmoil following the Supreme Court ruling that declared the NRO unconstitutional. These issues have allowed the military, which over the last years has come under criticism as Pakistanis came to see its meddling in politics and especially in sponsoring of radical groups as a threat to their peace and security, to reassert itself in Pakistani society. This cannot help the development of sustainable democracy in Pakistan.
The death of 24 regular Pakistani troops who according to Pakistani sources were over a mile into Pakistani territory has allowed the army to claim again that Pakistan needs the army more than ever, as the country comes under more and more threats. Pakistanis remember the way their civilian leaders capitulated over the Raymond Davis incident and the killing of Osama bin Laden, and Pakistanis are tired of these violations, especially among the rank-and-file who view these violations as a stain on their honor. Thus, as the army’s stock rises on the Pakistani street, politicians and public leaders’ emphasize that violations of Pakistani sovereignty will no longer be tolerated. This has major implications for the U.S. and the region, as we are likely to see a more aggressive Pakistani foreign policy that will only further frustrate Washington. That is, Pakistani leaders – civilians and military – will now need to bang the jingoistic, nationalist drum even louder than before.
All hope must rest on the enigmatic General Kayani, the Pakistani army chief, who now must devise a way to continue to work with the United States, the bête noire for his middle-ranking officers, who last year at the National Defense University challenged their commander as to why they are engaged in a war in the tribal belt.[8] It is imperative that the United States take drastic measures to change AfPak, as it is clearly not working. Afghans are frustrated with the U.S. presence, as are many Pakistanis. Washington must understand that U.S. national security does not lie solely on having physical presence in South Asia, as whenever mistakes occur, it not only destroys months and years of great hard work undertaken by the indefatigable U.S. military, whose commitment to bring a better tomorrow for South Asia has been commendable, but instead fosters anti-Americanism, which ultimately undermines U.S. national security.
Notes:
[1] “NATO attack allegedly kills 24 Pakistani troops,” The Guardian, November 26, 2011. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/9966595
[2] Major General Athar Abbas has declared, “I cannot rule out the possibility that this was deliberate attack by ISAF.” Julian Borger and Saeed Shah, “NATO braces for reprisals after deadly air strike on Pakistan border post.” The Guardian November 27, 2011.
[3] This is not the first time that Pakistani troops have died
[4] “Out of the Blue,” The Economist, July 30, 2011. http://www.economist.com/node/21524916
[5] Mansoor Ijaz, “Time to take on Pakistan’s Jiahdist Spies.” The Financial Times, October 10, 2011. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5ea9b804-f351-11e0-b11b-00144feab49a.html#axzz1eXvw8zO0
[6] “‘Nato should act against terrorist safe havens in Afghanistan,’” Dawn.com. October 29, 2011. http://www.dawn.com/2011/10/29/%E2%80%98nato-should-act-against-terrorist-safe-havens-in-afghanistan%E2%80%99.html
[7] In 2001, India purchased 310 T-90S main battle tanks, which include also permission to build 1,000 tanks at the Heavy Vehicle Factory (HVF) in Avadi, Chennai and a full technology transfer. Delivery of the technology has been slowed while the tanks have not been battle-worthy. Ajai Shukla, “Technology transfer, supply of assemblies hit Russian stonewall,” Business Standard, November 28, 2011. http://business-standard.com/india/news/technology-transfer-supplyassemblies-hit-russian-stonewall/456891/
[8] Kathy Gannon, “NATO raid in Pakistan undercuts rapprochement,” CBS News, November 28 2011. http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-501712_162-57331776/nato-raid-in-pakistan-undercuts-rapprochement/
Tuesday, December 20, 2011
Tuesday, February 15, 2011
The Madrid Bombings and Global Jihadism
Since the attacks of 11 September 2001 on New York and Washington DC there has been an ongoing controversy about whether the real threat of global terrorism is posed by al-Qaeda, its territorial extensions and affiliated organisations, or by decentralised groups inspired by, but unconnected to, such entities. The 11 March 2004 Madrid train bombings are often held up as the archetype of an independent local cell at work, and the perpetrators depicted as self-recruited, leaderless terrorists. Six years after the blasts, however, new evidence connecting some of the most notorious members of the Madrid bombing network with al-Qaeda’s senior leadership, along with features of the terrorist network itself and distinctive elements of the likely strategy behind the blasts, suggest that these assumptions are misleading. Judicial documentation now fully accessible at Spain’s National Court and other relevant primary or secondary sources can help us better understand what the attacks can tell us about al-Qaeda and a global terrorism in transition, as well as about the changing nature of the threat to open societies.1
911 days after
Two-and-a-half years, or exactly 911 days, after 9/11, another spectacular act of mass-casualty terrorism took place on the other side of the Atlantic, and against a much softer target: commuter trains on the railway line connecting the historical town of Alcalá de Henares with Madrid’s downtown Atocha station. Thirteen bombs, each containing no less than 10 kilograms of dynamite and about 650 grams of ironmongery, were placed inside plastic bags and backpacks in 12 different carriages on four trains filled to rush-hour capacity.2 Some of the 10 to perhaps 13 terrorists who placed the bombs arrived in two vehicles. One, a van, was found by the national police on the morning of the attacks and the other, a car, was discovered three months later. In the former, detonators and traces of explosives were found next to audio cassettes with recordings of Koranic recitations, while in the latter there was a suitcase with more tapes exalting a bellicose notion of jihad.3 Ten of the bombs exploded almost simultaneously, between 7:37 and 7:41am. They were detonated by means of cellular phones synchronised in the alarm function (the same brand and model of cellular phone had been used in a similar way in the November 2002 bombings in Bali).4 Another two devices placed in the rail carriages, as well as an additional bomb left on a flag-stop platform, failed to explode. Disposal experts successfully defused ne of these bombs in the early hours of 12 March, providing crucial evidence to further the police investigation of the attacks.
As a result of the blasts in the commuter trains, however, 191 people were killed and 1,841 injured.5 Though the attacks caused immediate material damages of €17.62 million, the minimum direct economic cost has been estimated at more than €211.58m.6 The Madrid train bombings were thus not only the most devastating act of insurgent terrorism in modern Spain, but in Western Europe. In lethality, moreover, they were second only to the mid-air bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over the Scottish town of Lockerbie in December 1988 that killed the 259 passengers and crew on board and 11 people on the ground. But the Madrid bombings were not the only attacks intended by their perpetrators. On 2 April, making use of similar explosive substances and detonators, individuals belonging to the same terrorist cell prepared to derail a Seville-bound high-speed train in transit through the province of Toledo. The subsequent police investigation found that they had accumulated information on new targets in and around Madrid, such as a Jewish recreational facility for children and young people, a Jewish school, British educational centres and national public institutions.7 The terrorists had stored weapons and explosives in abundance. They had formally rented their rural operational base in the municipality of Chinchón, in use by cell members since October 2002, on 28 January 2004. On 4 March, they had rented a safe house close to the city of Granada, in southern Spain, and from 8 March a hideout in the metropolitan dormitory city of Leganés, near Madrid.8 They also retained a financial reserve of almost €1.5m. By comparison, the overall cost of the 11 March train attacks was estimated by the authorities at no less than €105,000, although not all possible expenses are included in this calculation.9 The Madrid bombing network was mainly financed through trafficking in illicit drugs, which were also traded for industrial explosives stolen from a mine in Asturias, in northern Spain, by a criminal band of native Spaniards.10
Further terrorist plans were disrupted not so much by the initial arrests on 13 March, but on 3 April, when experts from the then rather small national police intelligence unit devoted to international terrorism discovered the cell’s hideout in Leganés. Of the eight terrorists present, one managed to escape on foot, while the remaining seven, all cornered in the same flat, first fired shots and shouted Islamic slogans, then blew themselves up minutes after 9:00pm. A special-operations agent was killed and several others injured by the explosion, and a complete apartment complex (evacuated by the security forces) was destroyed. This may well have been the first suicide explosion in Western Europe related to the current web of global terrorism.11 Even if this was a reactive incident prompted by the terrorists’ perception of an ongoing police operation against them, among those who perpetrated the commuter-train blasts were individuals willing to become suicide bombers at any time, as suggested by the farewell letters left behind, at least one of which had been written prior to the Madrid attacks.12 The bombings of 11 March 2004 had other serious domestic consequences, both political and social. They occurred three days before the Spanish general elections on Sunday 14 March. Prime Minister José María Aznar’s incumbent liberal-conservative Partido Popular (Popular Party, PP) had every reason to believe it would retain its majority in Spain’s bicameral parliament and control over the central government. Reliable surveys conducted in the weeks before polling day, however, registered a gradually narrowing gap and indicated that the PP’s support was statistically very close to that of the moderate left-wing Partido Socialista Obrero Español (Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party, PSOE). Regardless of other considerations (including the government’s counterproductive insistence that the Basque terrorist group ETA was behind the attacks, when emerging evidence clearly pointed towards jihadist terrorism) there is little doubt that the mobilisation of a significant additional segment of the electorate spurred by the terrorist massacre and its contentious aftermath secured the Socialists’ victory.13 After the election, Spanish society became deeply divided over who was to blame for the train blasts.
Yet, on the same day of the bombings, at around 7:30pm local time in London and 8:30pm in Madrid, Al Quds al Arabi, a well-known Arabiclanguage daily published in the British capital received an e-mail claiming responsibility for the attacks. Earlier that evening the editor had been told over the phone by someone in a country in the Gulf to expect this special e-mail. Like other messages sent by Osama bin Laden’s organisation to the newspaper since the late 1990s, it was seen as a genuine al-Qaeda communiqué, and immediately made public.14 It was signed by the Abu Hafs al Masri Brigade/al-Qaeda. This same designation, referring to Mohamed Atef, a former head of al-Qaeda’s military committee who was killed in 2001 in Afghanistan, had been used before to claim responsibility for attacks such as those of November 2003 in Nasiriya and Istanbul. Moreover, two days later, on 13 March, at around 7:30pm, an individual, speaking in Spanish but with a noticeable Arab accent, called the regional broadcasting corporation Telemadrid to let its executives know of a video cassette left inside a litter bin near the so-called M-30 mosque, Madrid’s largest Islamic place of worship and community centre. On the tape, recorded minutes after 5:00pm that same day by the train bombers themselves, a hooded terrorist, dressed in white and holding a Sterling assault rifle, read a statement claiming responsibility for the train attacks on behalf of Abu Dujan al Afghani, presented as the spokesman of the military wing of Ansar al-Qaeda in Europe.
Outside Spain, the issue is certainly not whether the Madrid bombings were an expression of jihadist terrorism or the indiscriminate manifestation of Basque ethno-nationalist terrorism. There is an overwhelming consensus broadly attributing the commuter-train blasts to individuals associated with a radical Islamist orientation. The issue is rather the characteristics of those individuals and whether they are to be conceived as part of an amorphous and leaderless phenomenon or as part of a polymorphous and still more-often-than-not centrally led web of global terrorism. Were the Madrid bombings a case of home-grown, al-Qaeda-inspired terrorism or did those who prepared and executed the blasts have international connections with al-Qaeda or any of its affiliated organisations? Analysis of the Madrid bombing network, new evidence available about its ties with al- Qaeda’s command structures in North Waziristan, and an assessment of the strategy behind the commuter-trains blast support the second of these propositions.
Analysing the network
The network behind the 2004 Madrid train bombings came together between September 2002 and November 2003.15 First the desire and then the decision to perpetrate a terrorist attack in Spain led to the coalescing of four relatively small clusters of people. Two of these clusters were particularly interconnected, as they evolved from the remnants of an important al-Qaeda cell established in Spain around the middle of the 1990s. This jihadist cell was substantially, but not completely, dismantled during the months following 11 September 2001, when it was led by the Syrian-born Imad Eddin Barakat Yarkas, better known as Abu Dahdah.16 A third cluster was linked to the structure established that same decade by the Moroccan Islamist Combatant Group (MICG) across Western Europe, particularly in France and Belgium.17 The fourth cluster initially consisted of a gang of delinquents active throughout Spain who specialised in the trafficking of illicit drugs and stolen vehicles.18
Although the number of people directly or indirectly connected to the network may be larger, there are 27 individuals about whom there is both empirical evidence and legal grounds to implicate them in the preparation or execution of the 11 March attacks.19 These individuals comprise the 16 already tried and convicted (13 in Spain, two in Morocco and one in Italy) in relation to the blasts on the commuter trains; the seven who committed suicide on 3 April 2004; and four known fugitives, one of whom was handedbover to the Moroccan authorities after being arrested in Syria in 2007 and finally convicted in Rabat in January 2009 for involvement in the Madrid bombings. Not unexpectedly, all were men, born between 1960 and 1983. More than half were aged between 23 and 33 at the time of the train bombings. Most were native Moroccans, except for three Algerians, an Egyptian, a Tunisian and a Lebanese national.20 All but three were living in Spain, most of them in or around Madrid, when the attacks took place. Two, however, lived in Brussels and one in Milan. Typically, although not exclusively, they were economic migrants, some residing legally and others illegally. Many were single, although a significant number were married and a few even had children. Although their sociological profiles were quite diverse, they tended to show low levels of both formal education and occupational status. But those mobilised in the Madrid bombing network (which can hardly be considered a case of homegrown terrorism) did not all adopt jihadist ideology, become radicalised and be recruited in the same place, at the same time or through the same processes.21
Three of the 27 individuals implicated in the Madrid bombings were involved in the earlier al-Qaeda cell in Spain: Sarhane ben Abdelmajid Fakhet (better known as ‘The Tunisian’ because of his country of origin) and Jamal Zougam, both of whom played key roles in the attacks, and Said Berraj, also a prominent member of the network.22 The owner of the property in Chinchón rented by the terrorists as their base of operations was Mohamed Needel Acaid, a Syrian detained in November 2001 for his involvement in that same al-Qaeda cell and convicted in 2005.23 Allekema Lamari, one of the Leganés suicides, had indirect ties with the same cell. Initially arrested in Valencia in 1997 for membership in the Armed Islamic Group of Algeria (GIA) and later convicted, he was released from prison due to a judicial error in 2002. His GIA cell was led by Salaheddin Benyaich, also known as Abu Mugen, who was close to Abu Dahdah in those years. A classified report from the Centro Nacional de Inteligencia (CNI, the Spanish National Intelligence Centre) dated 6 November 2003 mentioned Lamari’s suspicious behaviour and mentioned reliable informants who considered he was likely to organise and execute an imminent act of terrorism in the country.24 A further classified CNI note, dated 15 March 2004, commented that after his release from the penitentiary he had ‘sworn that Spain would pay very dearly for his arrest’ and that ‘he even declared that he would commit acts involving arson or derailment’. The note also stressed that he knew well ‘Valencia, Tudela, Madrid and Alcalá de Henares’.25 Hassan el Haski and Youssef Belhadj, two prominent members of the MICG based in Belgium, were also among the 27 individuals involved in the Madrid bombing network. The former was very close to Abdelkader Hakimi, head of the MICG in Europe, well aware of the terrorist plans in Spain and an acquaintance of Jamal Zougam.26 Youssef Belhadj was also, according to the declaration of his nephew during the judicial investigation of the train attacks, a member of al-Qaeda.27 He frequently travelled to Madrid to meet his associates who had joined the local jihadist cell.28 On 3 March 2004 at 8:35pm, just eight days before the attacks, he flew back to Brussels from Madrid, where he had been for the previous month.29 Indeed, when the Belgian police arrested Belhadj they found two cellular phones in his Brussels bedroom. The one he regularly used operated with a pre-paid card acquired on 19 October 2003, the day after Osama bin Laden threatened Spain in a message aired on the Qatari-based television channel al-Jazeera, although it had been obtained with a false identity, with a fake 11 March 1921 date of birth.30 The second phone found in Belhadj’s bedroom, commonly used by his brother Mimoun, used another pre-paid card purchased shortly after the first and again obtained using a false identity, this time with 16 May as the fictitious date of birth. It may not have been coincidence that 16 May and 11 March were the dates of the 2003 Casablanca attacks – when a Spanish restaurant was targeted – and the planned date for the Madrid bombings, respectively.31 Similarly, 1921 may have been chosen as a reference to Sura 21 of the Koran, which alludes to the time when unbelievers ‘will not be able to ward off the fire from their faces, nor yet from their backs, and no help can reach them!’.
Another individual involved in the Madrid bombing network was Rabei Osman el Sayed Ahmed (known as ‘Mohamed the Egyptian’), a former member of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (merged with al-Qaeda in 2001). He spent at least five years in the Egyptian army and served in a brigade based in Port Said specialising in explosives. Confidential sources indicated to the Spanish authorities that Rabei Osman had been interned in the maximumsecurity penitentiary of Abu Zaa Abal, where those suspected or convicted of terrorist activities were usually imprisoned. He was an active al-Qaeda recruiter in Western Europe of people likely to become suicide terrorists. The Italian security forces secretly taped and filmed him doing just that in the flat where he lived in Milan before he was arrested in June 2004 because of his close links with some of the commuter-train bombers detained in Spain. Rabe Osman lived in Spain from 2002 to February 2003, during which, together with Fakhet, he was active in radicalising youngsters in and around mosques.32 As one of the Italian films clearly shows, in the course of indoctrinating a potential new recruit he claimed involvement in the Madrid bombings.33 Indeed, he opened and activated an e-mail account in a Yahoo server, inserting fictitious personal data, including 11 March 1970 as date of birth.34 Rabei Osman also knew in advance about the 11 March date. On 4 February 2004, following his return to Italy from a last trip to Spain before the attacks, In addition to the individuals already mentioned, and their associates, the Madrid bombing network also included several former delinquents, individuals who had been part of a gang regularly engaged in trafficking drugs and stolen cars before joining the jihadist network in summer 2003. Their boss Jamal Ahmidan (also known as ‘The Chinese’), however, was not a newcomer to jihadist circles. He had become radicalised by 1996, following four years of internment under a false identity in the Spanish penitentiary of Valdemoro, near Madrid, convicted of drug offences. His attitudes became even more extreme during a further period of imprisonment in Morocco between 2000 and June 2003.35 Prior to this, in 1999, Ahmidan met with Abu Dahdah, then leader of Spain’s al-Qaeda cell, in the Netherlands and expressed the desire to go and fight in Chechnya.36 Loyalty towards ‘The Chinese’, as the band’s lynchpin, seems to have been the key factor in the involvement in the commuter-train plot of this group of petty criminals.
An al-Qaeda connection
The clue that connects the Madrid bombing network to the al-Qaeda hierarchy appeared more than four years ago, although it was only confirmed over the last two months of 2009. It came to light in a remote mountainous location in northwestern Pakistan, not far from the Afghan border. In the early hours of 1 December 2005, a Hellfire missile hit a compound in the village of Haisori, close to Miran Shah, the administrative capital of Northern Waziristan, one of the seven agencies which form the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The core of al-Qaeda’s leadership, most of its commanders as well as many of its members and those of affiliated groups, relocated in FATA and the adjacent North West Frontier Province between late 2001 and the beginning of 2002. Al-Qaeda also relocated a large number of its active militants and most of its training infrastructure to North Waziristan between the middle of 2004 and the beginning of 2005,37 and has benefited from the protection afforded by Talibanised sectors of the indigenous Pashtun communities. The Hellfire, launched by one of the unmanned Predator drones used by the US Central Intelligence Agency to target al-Qaeda leaders and commanders detected along the frontier between Pakistan and Afghanistan, killed five people. Among them was Egyptian Hamza Rabia, then head of al-Qaeda’s external operations command and the man responsible for the organisation’s plots in North America and Western Europe. At the time of his death, Rabia was regarded as one of the top five (possibly top three) people at al-Qaeda’s core. Early in 2002, Osama bin Laden had split al-Qaeda’s operational structure into two commands. The internal operations command was assigned to Mustafa al Uzayti (also known as Abu Faraj al Libi), focusing on Afghanistan and Pakistan. Leadership of the external operations command was initially assigned to Khalid Sheik Mohamed, who masterminded the 11 September attacks in the United States. When Khalid Sheik Mohamed was arrested in Rawalpindi on March 2003, al Libi likewise became engaged in external operations, although command was assumed by Rabia.38
One of the four men who died with Rabia was identified by US intelligence, some weeks later, as Amer Azizi. A Moroccan, Azizi gained prominence as a member of the al-Qaeda cell established in Spain during the 1990s. Abu Dahdah, the leader of that cell after 1995, recruited Azizi and sent him to a training camp in Afghanistan perhaps as early as 2000, but certainly before mid-2001. Azizi was formally prosecuted in absentia by Spain’s National Court for terrorist offences attributed to that cell after he managed to escape from Spain following the police operation which substantially dismantled the cell in November 2001. While active in Spain’s al-Qaeda cell, Azizi forged close ties to individuals who later became key members of the Madrid bombing network. These included the network initiator, Mustafa Maymouni, now imprisoned in Morocco for the Casablanca attacks, as well as ‘The Tunisian’, Zougam and Berraj.
In the past there has been speculation that Azizi was the instigator of the attacks. But it was only in December 2008, when a Crown Court in Manchester convicted two British citizens of Pakistani extraction (under surveillance since 2005 and arrested in 2006), of being an important member of al-Qaeda and his acolyte, that indications that a terrorist with Azizi’s background was a key associate of Rabia emerged. This individual, called Ilyas, was mistakenly believed to be Mamoun Darkazanli. A British expert commented during the Manchester trial that Darkazanli was wanted in Spain for the Madrid bombings, which was not the case. Darkazanli, moreover, continues to live in Hamburg, Germany. Ilyas, however, is also one of the aliases used by Azizi. When Rabia was killed, his likely right-hand man Azizi died alongside him.39 According to senior American officials, information on the death of Azizi, as Rabia’s adjutant, was forwarded to the Spanish authorities informally in September 2006 and through a printed report in September 2007.40 Azizi is repeatedly mentioned in no less than 141 of the 241 volumes on the Madrid bombings compiled by the National Court in Spain. His name is also referred to in eight of the 30 supplementary volumes completing the vast judicial documentation on the case. Taken together, these documents, the result of specialised law-enforcement investigations and international police exchanges, reveal on the one hand the close ties between Azizi and the individuals who played pivotal roles in the formation and subsequent development of the local terrorist cell that prepared and placed the 11 March bombs, and on the other hand his links with individuals and groups from North Africa involved in the web of global terrorism. It was through these links that he ended up in positions of importance within al-Qaeda’s senior leadership. In fact, before becoming a key associate of Rabia, Azizi operated alongside Abd al Hadi al Iraqi and was already linked to Said al Masri and Khalid Habib, all senior al-Qaeda leaders.41 Back from his trip to Afghanistan in early summer 2001, Azizi coopted Maymouni, also a Moroccan, who became his closest collaborator. In 2002 Maymouni, at the instigation of Abdulatif Mourafik (also known as Malek el-Andalusi), a member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) who allegedly became an associate of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (later head of al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia), initiated the network that perpetrated the Madrid bombings, and first rented the Chinchón base of operations in October of that year.42 Maymouni was investigated by the Spanish police in 2003 following the Casablanca attacks.43 After he was detained and imprisoned in Morocco in May 2003, other members of the local cell rented the property again in January 2004.44 Another Moroccan, Driss Chebli, and ‘The Tunisian’ came to lead the network when Maymouni was arrested. Chebli himself was incarcerated in Spain four months later, after being implicated in the Abu Dahdah cell case, and ‘The Tunisian’ became the local ringleader of the terrorist network. As the criminal proceedings on the Madrid bombings have shown, ‘The Tunisian’ was also radicalised and recruited by Azizi.45 Azizi and ‘The Tunisian’ had ‘frequent contacts’ and communicated by e-mail in 2002 and 2003.46 A 2005 report from Spain’s central police intelligence unit stated that ‘it is true that Amer Azizi was a friend of Sarhane ben Abdelmajid Fakhet, and it is possible that he provided advice through the Internet and even interceded in favour of the terrorist project being prepared in Madrid’.47 The court records show close links between Azizi and other perpetrators of the train bombings such as Zougam and the still-fugitive Berraj.48
Following a formal request from the French authorities concerning Zougam, already suspected of jihadist terrorism activities in 2000, the Spanish police searched his home in Madrid in June 2001 and found written contact details for Azizi.49 Berraj was with Azizi in Turkey in 2000, possibly on their way to Afghanistan, when both took part in a meeting with other known jihadists such as Salahedin Benyaich and former Guatánamo inmate Lahcen Ikasrien, all of whom were arrested by the Turkish authorities.50 Azizi’s ties to al-Qaeda’s affiliated North African organisations were consolidated during his stay in Afghanistan. The Martyr Abu Yahyia camp where he trained, around 30km north of Kabul, was run by the LIFG. Members of the MICG were indoctrinated and trained there as well. Indeed, leaders of both organisations agreed, towards the end of the 1990s, to coordinate their activities.51 It was in the Martyr Abu Yahyia camp that Azizi met el-Andalusi and a fellow Moroccan, Karim el-Mejjati, an important al-Qaeda operative and terrorist organiser later killed by Saudi security forces. Indeed, el-Mejjati visited Spain in 2001 and met with Azizi.52 Thus, as a result of his stay in the camp, Azizi became attached to the LIFG while retaining strong links with, if not a kind of dual membership in, the MICG. The MICG became affiliated to, and supported by, al-Qaeda from the beginning of 2001, when its founder Nafia Noureddine met first with Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri, and then with Mohammed Atef (Abu Hafs al Masri).53 At a training facility established by the MICG near Jalalabad, in Afghanistan, militants acquired expertise in constructing remote-control detonators and in how to use cellular phones to activate improvised explosive devices.54 A meeting that delegates of the LIFG, the MICG and the analogous Tunisian organisation held in Istanbul is of the utmost significance to make full sense of the Madrid train bombings. The Istanbul meeting was held in February 2002, the Casablanca attacks were perpetrated in May 2003 and the Madrid train bombings occurred in March 2004. It was at the Istanbul meeting that it was decided the jihad should not be limited to conflict zones but should be carried into the countries from which members of the groups originated or in which they were residing.55 The identical argument had been disseminated within the emerging Madrid bombing network since at least autumn 2002.56 Several of the individuals implicated in the Casablanca attacks were also involved in the Madrid bombings. Moreover, before el- Andalusi instructed Maymouni to form a terrorist cell in Madrid, he had ordered him to set up another one, also in 2002, in Kenitra, Morocco.57 A Spanish police report prepared with contributions from some foreign security services, moreover, substantiates information on cell-phone exchanges between ‘The Tunisian’ and Abu Abdullah al-Sadeq, emir of the LIFG, then temporarily in East Asia, a few months prior to the attacks.58 Al-Sadeq was later arrested in Bangkok and handed over to the Libyan authorities.
An underlying strategy?
The will to perpetrate an act of jihadist terrorism in Spain dates to late 2001 and early 2002.59 It was initially motivated by revenge following a major police operation which dismantled and incarcerated most of the members of the al-Qaeda cell led by Abu Dahdah. It is no coincidence that three prominent members of the Madrid bombing network were tied to that cell. Soon afterwards, the desire to attack was enhanced by the determination expressed by the joint strategic decision adopted at the meeting in Istanbul in February 2002. The invasion of Iraq added a further motivation and provided an opportunity for those wishing to perpetrate a terrorist attack to converge. A good starting point for assessing the strategy underlying the 2004 Madrid bombings is the audio recording by Osama bin Laden aired by al-Jazeera in October 2003, in which he threatened Spain and five other countries (in addition to the United States), for having deployed soldiers in Iraq.60 On 26 October, an e-mail sent to the London-based al-Majallah weekly by Abu Muhammad al Ablaj (referred to by the paper as an important al- Qaeda figure) announced: ‘We are preparing for a great day’ in ‘a place in the Western countries’ mentioned by Osama bin Laden in his message, excluding the United States. A number of observers have been inclined to view the commuter-train blasts as inspired by two jihadist documents. One, ‘Jihad in Iraq: Hopes and Dangers’, contains a sophisticated argument on how to induce the United States’ coalition partners, in particular Spain, then a major European contributor, to pull their troops out of Iraq by striking at their soldiers, so that other countries might be expected to follow. The other document, ‘A Message to the Spanish People’, hinted at the possibility of an attack within Spain.61 However, by the time the former was promulgated in September 2003 and both were published on the Global Islamic Media Centre website in December, the Madrid bombing network was nearly complete and the decision to perpetrate a major attack already made. There are, moreover, no traces of either document having been viewed or downloaded through any of the computers used by the terrorists. The timing, sequence and contents of the communiqués claiming responsibility for the attacks are also interesting. Besides those issued on 11 and 13 March, a communiqué from the Abu Hafs al Masri Brigades/al-Qaeda appeared on 15 March (the day after the general election) and a second message from the local terrorist cell, whose members also recorded some unreleased videos on 27 March, was broadcast on 3 April. The 11 March communiqué by the Abu Hafs al Masri Brigades/al-Qaeda was sent by e-mail to the editor of Al Quds al Arabi who, on the basis of previous experience with other al-Qaeda claims received by the same newspaper, considered it authentic. The Spanish national police, which rated the communiqué as ‘relatively trustworthy’, corroborated how the e-mail was forwarded from Iran, though it could have technically originated in Yemen, Egypt or Libya.62 The text, written in Arabic, said among other things that: The death squad has managed to penetrate the bowels of Crusading Europe, striking one of the pillars of the Crusader alliance, Spain, with a painful blow. This is part of the settling of old scores with the Crusading Spain, the ally of America in its war against Islam. Where is America, Aznar? Who will protect you, Great Britain, Italy, Japan and other agents? When we struck against the Italian troops in Nasiriya we already sent a warning to America’s agents: withdraw from the alliance against Islam. It thus claimed responsibility for the attacks and justified them by referring to Spain both as an ally of the United States and as a country with which there was a score to settle. This might well allude to the Muslim territory on the Iberian Peninsula lost to the Christians in the fifteenth century, to the persecution and imprisonment of many al-Qaeda members and followers in Spain since autumn 2001, or both. The issue of Iraq is framed in the broader terms of armed religious confrontation, and the Spanish prime minister is mentioned as the personification of that policy. The Nasiriya attacks of 12 November 2003 were also attributed to al-Qaeda by Abu Muhammad al Ablaj in an e-mail sent nine days later to al-Majallah. One of the bombers in those attacks was recruited and travelled to Iraq through the same transnational network that helped some of those implicated in the Madrid blasts to escape from Spain.63 However, there appeared to be no implicit or explicit allusion in this initial communiqué to the general elections to be held on 14 March. The message does include a clear demand, reiterating the notion of a clash between religions, to citizens of the West as opposed to their ruling elites: ‘The people of the allies of the United States should force their governments to end this alliance in the war against terrorism, which means the war against Islam. If you stop the war, we shall stop ours’. Although the invasion and occupation of Iraq were overwhelmingly unpopular in Spain and had became a major electoral issue, the terrorists might have been seeking to affect Spanish public opinion in general, to influence governmental foreign-policy decisions, rather than voting behaviour in particular. The videotape released on 13 March by the local cell included statements such as ‘we declare our responsibility for what happened in Madrid exactly two and a half years after the attacks on New York and Washington’ and ‘we swear by the Almighty that if you do not halt in your injustice and in the deaths of Moslems with the excuse of combating terrorism, we shall blow your houses up in the air and spill your blood as if it were a river. We are prepared for what will fill your hearts with terror.’ Although the terrorists did not refer to the general elections, the tape was hurriedly recorded at around 5:00pm on the eve of election day and delivered in time for nationwide release by the media. After the 14 March election, the extent to which the local cell in Madrid followed the directives issued by Abu Hafs al Masri Brigades/al-Qaeda from the Gulf became clear. On 17 March, a fax signed by the latter organisation and dated 15 March was received in another London-based Arabic-language newspaper, Al Hayat, and also sent by e-mail to Al Quds al Arabiya. This communiqué mentioned both the elections and the electoral outcome when explaining why the initial claim of responsibility had appeared with unusual speed: ‘In the case of the battle of Madrid, the time factor was very important to finish with the government of the contemptible Aznar’, and added that ‘we have given the Spanish people the choice between war and peace, and they have chosen peace by voting for the party that stood up against the American alliance in its war against Islam’. Clearly alluding to Spain’s Islamic past, as well as to the incoming government, it announced that our leadership has decided to halt all operations on the soil of Al Andalus against what are known as civilian targets until we are sure of the direction the new government will take, that has promised to withdraw Spanish troops from Iraq, and thereby make sure that there is no interference by the new executive in matters concerning Moslems. For this reason we reiterate the decision to all battalions on European soil to cease operations.
This communiqué was posted on the Global Islamic Media Centre website on 18 March, as ‘Notification for the Nation regarding the suspension of operations in the land of Al Andalus’. It was downloaded the following morning at 10:16am to a portable computer found by the Spanish police in the home of Jamal Ahmidan, ‘The Chinese’.64 This explains the second message from the local cell (once more presented as coming from Abu Dujan al-Afgani) on 3 April, hours before the suicide explosion in Leganés. This message was hand-written by ‘The Tunisian’65 and faxed to the national newspaper ABC in Madrid, with the warning that ‘we, the Death Battalion, announce the annulment of our previous truce’, threatening Spaniards with ‘making your country an inferno and making your blood flow like rivers’ unless certain demands, including the withdrawal of troops from Iraq and Afghanistan, were met within 24 hours by the ‘people and Government of Spain’.66 But it was not the local cell but rather the Abu Hafs al Masri Brigades/al-Qaeda that had declared the truce this message was now terminating. The local cell in Madrid seems always to have accepted the premises transmitted in advance by the Abu Hafs al Masri Brigade/al-Qaeda from the Gulf.67 Whether they directed the local cell to end the truce or the decision was adopted autonomously (though in line with the 15 March communiqué) is uncertain. However, in the message faxed 3 April, the local cell leader established a 24-hour deadline, whereas in a video he and other terrorists recorded on 27 March that was never released, the deadline was fixed at eight days. So at least as early as 27 March, days after the new government expressed its intention to withdraw Spanish troops from Iraq but increase the number of soldiers in Afghanistan, the Madrid bombers clearly had it in mind to perpetrate a new act of terrorism on or after 4 April. Al-Qaeda’s leaders seem to have been more restrained than other global terrorists in exploiting the 2004 Madrid bombings for propaganda purposes.68 Osama bin Laden first mentioned them a month later in an audio recording broadcast by Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya on 15 April in which he offered a peace treaty to the Europeans. In this message, the commuter-train blasts were interpreted from a Muslim defence angle: ‘There is a lesson regarding what happens in occupied Palestine and what happened on September 11 and March 11. These are your goods returned to you.’69 On 16 November 2005, top al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri alluded to the 11 March attacks in a video praising the suicide bombings of 7 July 2005 in London as ‘the blessed raid which, like its illustrious predecessors in New York, Washington and Madrid, took the battle to the enemy’s own soil’.70 Not until 19 January 2006, when a new video recording was aired by Al Jazeera, did bin Laden again refer to the case, this time indirectly and in conjunction with the London bombings: ‘The war against America and its allies has not remained limited to Iraq, as Bush claims. Evidence of this is the explosions you have witnessed in the capitals of the most important European countries that are members of this hostile coalition.’ 71 Since September 2008, al-Qaeda has frequently introduced graphic material from the commuter-train blasts to illustrate the actions of its global jihad. These images are now being reproduced in propaganda videos by al- Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb as well. * * * It is no accident that the sentence in the Madrid bombing case refers to all those individuals prosecuted and convicted for the attacks as ‘members of terrorist cells and groups of jihadist type’.72 In contrast to the conventional wisdom, in this important judicial document there is not a single mention of ‘local cells’, ‘independent cells’, ‘independent local cells’ or similar concepts. Indeed, what the commuter-train bombings revealed about al-Qaeda and global terrorism two-and-a-half years after the 11 September attacks in the United States, is far more dynamic and complex. In the broadest sense, what happened in Madrid was telling about al-Qaeda’s continued activity in instigating, approving and probably facilitating spectacular acts of terrorism in the West, particularly in Europe. This activity continues, even if there has been a noticeable change in the scope and limitations of al-Qaeda’s capabilities. The commuter-train blasts also shed light on the re-orientation from 2002 onwards of al-Qaeda’s affiliated North African organisations, leading to the recent constitution of an al-Qaeda regional extension in the Maghreb. In a more detailed sense, the attacks spoke volumes about the mobilisation, within open societies, of firstgeneration Muslim immigrants as terrorists. This adds to the radicalisation and recruitment of second- and third-generation immigrants elsewhere. Overall, the Madrid train bombings revealed much about global terrorism as a polymorphous phenomenon, with diverse and heterogeneous interacting components whose leaders recognise a top-down hierarchy of command and control, but which is flexible and adapted to specific circumstances, producing extraordinary combinations when necessary and allowing the strategies of international actors and the aspirations of local activists to converge at the operational level.
But the attacks of 11 March 2004 illuminate not just jihadist terrorism in transition. They also shed light on the changing nature of the threat. They were not planned, prepared or executed by al-Qaeda alone. Neither were they the product of autonomous self-constituted cells. The Madrid bombing network speaks for itself as a complex, composite source of threat, where individuals from different groups and organisations converge. The blasts also point to the terrorists’ lasting predilection for public-transport systems as soft targets, their preference for the use of improvised explosive devices and their suicidal determination. Finally, the Madrid attacks reveal much about terrorist strategy. Al-Qaeda’s broad guidelines, decisions adopted by associated organisations and the subordinate vision of local cells can converge to make the best of favourable opportunities.
*Fernando Reinares is Professor of Political Science and Security Studies at Universidad Rey Juan Carlos in Madrid, and Co-Director of the Program on Global Security and Senior Analyst on International Terrorism at Real Instituto Elcano.
Notes:
1 The criminal proceedings over the Madrid train bombings accumulated 241 volumes and 30 separate pieces, including previously secret records and reserved documents, comprising a total of 93,226 pages of files (Sumario 20/2004). In addition, available documentation includes sentences handed down by the National Court and the Supreme Court, as well as data from related criminal proceedings and sentences delivered in Milan, Italy and Salé, Morocco.
2 Audiencia Nacional, Juzgado Central de Instrucción no. 6, Sumario 20/2004, vol. 161, pp. 60,764 and 60,771.
3 Sumario 20/2004, vol. 68, p. 20,629 and vol. 161, p. 60,767.
4 Ibid., vol. 161, p. 60,858.
5 Audiencia Nacional, Sala de lo Penal, Sección Segunda, Sentencia 65/2007, pp. 229–422.
6 On the immediate material damages, see Sumario 20/2004, vol. 216, p. 84,062. On the direct economic costs, see Mikel Buesa, Aurelia Vilariño, Joost Heijs, Thomas Baumert and Javier González, ‘The Economic Cost of March 11: Measuring the Direct Economic Cost of the Terrorist Attack on March 11, 2004 in Madrid’, Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 19, no. 4, Winter 2007, pp. 489–509.
7 Sumario 20/2004, vol. 162, pp. 61,522–4.
8 Ibid., separate piece 29, annex II, document 8, and annex IV, document 2. It should be noted that the terrorists always made rental arrangements using falsified identity documents.
9 Ibid., separate piece 29, annex II, documents 15 and 16. 10 On the financing of the Madrid train bombings, see Sumario 20/2004, separate piece 10.
11 Rogelio Alonso and Fernando Reinares, ‘Maghreb Immigrants becoming Suicide Terrorists. A Case Study of Religious Radicalization Processes in Spain’, in Ami Pedahzur (ed.), Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism: The Globalization of Martyrdom (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 179–97.
12 ‘This is my testament’, wrote a member of the local cell, before the attacks, to his close relatives. In the letter, he insists on jihad as ‘an obligation for the faithful’, adding first that ‘I cannot live in this world, humiliated and weakened before the eyes of infidels and tyrants’, and then a wish for his sons and daughters: ‘My wish is for them to be religiously wise and mujahedeen’. He concludes: ‘I have chosen death as the path for life’. Sumario 20/2004, vol. 61, p. 18,591; vol. 81, pp. 18,634 and 25,176; and vol. 162, pp. 61,529–30, 61,556–8.
13 Ignacio Lago and José R. Montero, The 2004 Election in Spain: Terrorism, Accountability, and Voting, working paper no. 253 (Barcelona: Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials, 2006).
14 Abdel Bari Atwan, The Secret History of Al-Qa’ida (London: Abacus, 2007), p. 116.
15 Sumario 20/2004, vol. 97, p. 31,840.
16 This cell was detected by the police at the end of 1994. Among its founding members were Anwar Adnan Mohamed Saleh, also known as Chej Salah, who moved from Madrid to Peshawar in October 1995, and Mustafa Setmarian Nasar, better known as Abu Musab al Suri, who relocated to London four months earlier and then settled close to Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan. The cell was connected to the Hamburg cell that spawned the 11 September attacks. Abu Dahdah had been in contact with Mohammed Atta since the early 1990s. Abu Dahdah and 17 other individuals were convicted of terrorism-related offences by the National Court on 26 September 2005. Fifteen of these convictions were confirmed by the Supreme Court on 31 May 2006.
17 On the MICG and its links with the Madrid train bombings, see the comprehensive police report in Sumario 20/2004, vol. 97, pp. 31,838–72.
18 Sumario 20/2004, vol. 17, pp. 4,426–7 and vol. 191, pp. 74,612–13.
19 For legal and ethical reasons no mention is made here of persons who were detained following the attacks but never charged, or prosecuted but absolved of all charges. Others, convicted for dealing with stolen explosives that ended up in the hands of the terrorists, were not part of the jihadist network as such and are excluded from this analysis.
20 The Moroccans include Hassan el Haski, Youssef Belhadj, Mohamed Larbi ben Sellam, Jamal Ahmidan, Said Berraj, Mohamed Afalah, Jamal Zougam, Othman el Gnaoui, Fouad el Morabit Anghar, Saed el Harrak, Mohamed Bouharrat, Rachid Aglif, Abdelmajid Bouchar, Rifaat Anouar Asrih, Abdenabi Kounjaa, Mohamed Oulad Akcha, Rachid Oulad Akcha, Abdelilah Hriz, Mohamed Belhadj, Hamid Ahmidan and Hicham Ahmidan. The Algerians are Allekema Lamari, Daoud Ouhnane and Nasreddine Bousbaa. The Egyptian is Rabei Osman el Sayed Ahmed. The one Tunisian is Serhane ben Abdelmajid Fakhet and the one Lebanese is Mahmoud Slimane Aoun.
21 Fernando Reinares, ‘Jihadist Radicalization and the 2004 Madrid Bombing Network’, CTC Sentinel. vol. 2, Issue 11, 2009, pp. 16–19.
22 Fakhet, Zougam and Berraj were all investigated by the National Court over the al-Qaeda cell led by Abu Dahdah. See Sumario 20/2004, vol. 163, pp. 61,694–700, 61,735–44 and 61,781–801.
23 The real estate was registered under the name of his wife. See Sumario 20/2004, vol. 161, p. 60,823.
24 Sumario 20/2004, separate piece 11, pp. 790–93.
25 Ibid., pp. 793–4.
26 Ibid., vol. 97, pp. 31,898–9, and vol. 163, pp. 61,580–608. The Madrid bombing sentencing document refers to Hassan el Haski as a ‘leader of the Moroccan Islamic Combattant Group’. See Sentencia 65/2007, pp. 217 and 218. See also Tribunal de grande Instance de Paris, 16eme chamber/1, no. d’affaire 0313739016, jugement of 11 July 2007, p.p 55 and 73.
27 Sumario 20/2004, vol. 163, p. 61,627. Youssef Belhadj is defined in one document as a ‘member of one of the groups which form the al-Qaeda network’. Sentencia 65/2007, p. 215.
28 Sumario 20/2004, vol. 106, pp. 35,601– 14; vol. 115, pp. 39,970–73; vol. 133, p. 48,728–33, and vol. 163, pp. 61,608–24. 29 Ibid., vol. 180, p. 69,863.
30 Ibid., vol. 163, pp. 61,622–3; see also Sentencia 65/2007, pp. 216–17.
31 Sumario 20/2004, vol. 163, pp. 61,621–2.
32 Rabei Osman es Sayed Ahmed had been investigated by the national police’s antiterrorism branch in 2002 (Sumario 20/2004, vol. no. 17, p. 4,412; vol. 79, p. 24,154; vol. 81, p. 25,039, and vol. 163, pp. 61,643–63.
33 On 26 May 2004, while indoctrinating a young acolyte in his Milan apartment, he was taped as saying: ‘Listen, Yahya, be careful and do not speak. The whole Madrid operation was an idea of mine. They were among my most loved friends, fallen as martyrs, may Allah have mercy on them … This operation required many lessons and lots of patience over two and a half years.’ During the same radicalising speech, Ahmed asserted: ‘You have to join the al-Qaeda ranks. This is the solution, since the doors of al-Qaeda are open.’ Sumario 20/2004, vol. 163, pp. 61,650. Also Corte d’Assise di Milano, Sentenza 10/2006, p. 44.
34 Ibid., vol. 79, p. 24,191; vol. 163, p. 61,654. Also Corte d’Assise di Milano, Sentenza 10/2006, pp. 21–22.
35 Ibid., vol. 14, p. 3,632.
36 Audiencia Nacional, Sala de lo Penal, Sección Segunda, Sentencia 65/2007, p. 201.
37 Rohan Gunaratna and Anders Nielsen, ‘Al Qaeda in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan and Beyond’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 31, no. 9, September 2008, pp. 786–8.
38 Ibid., pp. 780, 783.
39 Oral confirmation to author by CIA sources present in Pakistan during the Haisori strike, and written confirmation from Spain’s police intelligence in November and December 2009.
40 Confirmed by personal oral communication from a senior CIA official on 23 December 2009 and in writing from Spain’s national police central counter-terrorism branch on 2 March 2010.
41 Written communication from Spain’s national police intelligence chief, 26 November 2009.
42 When Azizi escaped, Maymouni was ordered by Mourafik to go to Morocco, where Azizi’s wife, Raquel Burgos (a Spanish convert) had moved shortly after the disappearance of her husband, and help her to rejoin him, first in Turkey and then in Pakistan. See Sumario 20/2004, pp. 74,600–01. During its autumn 2009 offensive in South Waziristan, the Pakistani Army found and exhibited to the international press a passport belonging to Raquel Burgos, next to the passport of Said Bahaji, a German citizen and associate of the lead 9/11 hijacker Mohammed Atta. See http://afpak. foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/10/30/ daily_brief_passports_linked_to_911_ found_in_northwest_pakistan_military_ operations.
43 Investigated under Sumario 9/2003. See Sumario 20/2004, vol. 17, p. 4,423 and vol. 21, p. 5,583.
44 Sumario 20/2004, vol. 161, p. 60,823 and vol. 163, p. 61,726.
45 Ibid., vol. 163, pp. 61,740.
46 Testimony of a protected witness during the Madrid bombing trials at Spain’s National Court, Sumario 20/2004, vol. 114, p. 39514, and vol. 163, pp. 61,923-4.
47 Sumario 20/2004, vol. 161, p. 60,875.
48 Ibid., vol. 17, p. 4,414.
49 Ibid., vol. 163, pp. 61,784 and 61,679.
50 Ibid., vol. 17, p. 4,414 and vol. 193, p. 61,685.
51 Evan F. Kohlman, ‘Dossier: Libyan Islamic Fighting Group’, The NEFA Foundation, 2007, pp. 13–15, http:// www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/ nefalifg1007.pdf.
52 Sumario 20/2004, vol. 97, p. 31,345.
53 Peter L. Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I know (New York: Free Press, 2006), p. 279.
54 See Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, 16eme chamber/1, no. d’affaire 0313739016, jugement of 11 July 2007, p. 38, and Sumario 20/2004, vol. 191, p. 74,612.
55 An intelligence note of 17 December 2004 about this meeting and the strategic decision adopted is incorporated in the Madrid bombings criminal proceedings. See Sumario 20/2004, vol. 97, pp. 31,848 and 32,316
56 Audiencia Nacional, Juzgado Central de Instrucción 6, Auto of 5 July 2006, pp. 64–5.
57 Sumario 20/2004, vol. 97, p. 31,840.
58 Ibid., vol. 233, pp. 90,742–6.
59 This idea was also stressed by the public prosecutor’s office during the Madrid bombings case, as reflected in its final report submitted on 4 June 2007 by the public prosecutor to the Sala de lo Penal (Criminal Hall) at the National Court, pp. 12 and 13.
60 The other five countries were United Kingdom, Australia, Poland, Japan and Italy.
61 Brynjar Lia and Thomas Hegghammer, ‘Jihadi Strategic Studies: The Alleged Al Qaeda Policy Study Preceding the Madrid Bombings’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 27, no. 5, September– October 2004, pp. 355–75.
62 Sumario 20/2004, vol. 17, p. 4,405.
63 See Audiencia Nacional, Sala de lo Penal, Sección Primera, Sentencia 3/2010, p. 7.
64 Ibid., vol. 13, p.59,062; vol. 149, p. 56,763; vol. 156, p. 9,062, and vol. 161, p. 61,016.
65 Ibid., vol. 161, p. 60,872.
66 It also explains the contents of several video recordings made by the local cell on 27 March but not made public, where its ringleader announced the ending of the truce. See ibid., vol. 161, p. 60,873 and vol. 162, pp. 61,538–40. 67 In their general report on the Madrid bombings, the Spanish police state: ‘There is an assumed relationship between the Abu Hafs al Masri Brigades and the terrorist commando itself which acted in Madrid’, since there is an observable coincidence not only in ‘the form they called the operative group’ but also because in ending the truce ‘the terrorist commando of Madrid acted in consonance’ with the 17 March communiqué. Sumario 20/2004, vol. 161, p. 60,920.
68 Manuel R. Torres, ‘Spain as an Object of Jihadist Propaganda’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 32, no. 11, November 2009, pp. 940–41.
69 A translation of this audio recording is available at http://www.memri.org/ bin/articles.cgi?Area=sd&ID=SP69504.
70 See http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ middle_east/4443364.stm.
71 A translation of this audio recording is available at http://memri.org/bin/ latestnews.cgi?ID=SD107406.
72 Sentencia 65/2007, p. 172.
911 days after
Two-and-a-half years, or exactly 911 days, after 9/11, another spectacular act of mass-casualty terrorism took place on the other side of the Atlantic, and against a much softer target: commuter trains on the railway line connecting the historical town of Alcalá de Henares with Madrid’s downtown Atocha station. Thirteen bombs, each containing no less than 10 kilograms of dynamite and about 650 grams of ironmongery, were placed inside plastic bags and backpacks in 12 different carriages on four trains filled to rush-hour capacity.2 Some of the 10 to perhaps 13 terrorists who placed the bombs arrived in two vehicles. One, a van, was found by the national police on the morning of the attacks and the other, a car, was discovered three months later. In the former, detonators and traces of explosives were found next to audio cassettes with recordings of Koranic recitations, while in the latter there was a suitcase with more tapes exalting a bellicose notion of jihad.3 Ten of the bombs exploded almost simultaneously, between 7:37 and 7:41am. They were detonated by means of cellular phones synchronised in the alarm function (the same brand and model of cellular phone had been used in a similar way in the November 2002 bombings in Bali).4 Another two devices placed in the rail carriages, as well as an additional bomb left on a flag-stop platform, failed to explode. Disposal experts successfully defused ne of these bombs in the early hours of 12 March, providing crucial evidence to further the police investigation of the attacks.
As a result of the blasts in the commuter trains, however, 191 people were killed and 1,841 injured.5 Though the attacks caused immediate material damages of €17.62 million, the minimum direct economic cost has been estimated at more than €211.58m.6 The Madrid train bombings were thus not only the most devastating act of insurgent terrorism in modern Spain, but in Western Europe. In lethality, moreover, they were second only to the mid-air bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over the Scottish town of Lockerbie in December 1988 that killed the 259 passengers and crew on board and 11 people on the ground. But the Madrid bombings were not the only attacks intended by their perpetrators. On 2 April, making use of similar explosive substances and detonators, individuals belonging to the same terrorist cell prepared to derail a Seville-bound high-speed train in transit through the province of Toledo. The subsequent police investigation found that they had accumulated information on new targets in and around Madrid, such as a Jewish recreational facility for children and young people, a Jewish school, British educational centres and national public institutions.7 The terrorists had stored weapons and explosives in abundance. They had formally rented their rural operational base in the municipality of Chinchón, in use by cell members since October 2002, on 28 January 2004. On 4 March, they had rented a safe house close to the city of Granada, in southern Spain, and from 8 March a hideout in the metropolitan dormitory city of Leganés, near Madrid.8 They also retained a financial reserve of almost €1.5m. By comparison, the overall cost of the 11 March train attacks was estimated by the authorities at no less than €105,000, although not all possible expenses are included in this calculation.9 The Madrid bombing network was mainly financed through trafficking in illicit drugs, which were also traded for industrial explosives stolen from a mine in Asturias, in northern Spain, by a criminal band of native Spaniards.10
Further terrorist plans were disrupted not so much by the initial arrests on 13 March, but on 3 April, when experts from the then rather small national police intelligence unit devoted to international terrorism discovered the cell’s hideout in Leganés. Of the eight terrorists present, one managed to escape on foot, while the remaining seven, all cornered in the same flat, first fired shots and shouted Islamic slogans, then blew themselves up minutes after 9:00pm. A special-operations agent was killed and several others injured by the explosion, and a complete apartment complex (evacuated by the security forces) was destroyed. This may well have been the first suicide explosion in Western Europe related to the current web of global terrorism.11 Even if this was a reactive incident prompted by the terrorists’ perception of an ongoing police operation against them, among those who perpetrated the commuter-train blasts were individuals willing to become suicide bombers at any time, as suggested by the farewell letters left behind, at least one of which had been written prior to the Madrid attacks.12 The bombings of 11 March 2004 had other serious domestic consequences, both political and social. They occurred three days before the Spanish general elections on Sunday 14 March. Prime Minister José María Aznar’s incumbent liberal-conservative Partido Popular (Popular Party, PP) had every reason to believe it would retain its majority in Spain’s bicameral parliament and control over the central government. Reliable surveys conducted in the weeks before polling day, however, registered a gradually narrowing gap and indicated that the PP’s support was statistically very close to that of the moderate left-wing Partido Socialista Obrero Español (Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party, PSOE). Regardless of other considerations (including the government’s counterproductive insistence that the Basque terrorist group ETA was behind the attacks, when emerging evidence clearly pointed towards jihadist terrorism) there is little doubt that the mobilisation of a significant additional segment of the electorate spurred by the terrorist massacre and its contentious aftermath secured the Socialists’ victory.13 After the election, Spanish society became deeply divided over who was to blame for the train blasts.
Yet, on the same day of the bombings, at around 7:30pm local time in London and 8:30pm in Madrid, Al Quds al Arabi, a well-known Arabiclanguage daily published in the British capital received an e-mail claiming responsibility for the attacks. Earlier that evening the editor had been told over the phone by someone in a country in the Gulf to expect this special e-mail. Like other messages sent by Osama bin Laden’s organisation to the newspaper since the late 1990s, it was seen as a genuine al-Qaeda communiqué, and immediately made public.14 It was signed by the Abu Hafs al Masri Brigade/al-Qaeda. This same designation, referring to Mohamed Atef, a former head of al-Qaeda’s military committee who was killed in 2001 in Afghanistan, had been used before to claim responsibility for attacks such as those of November 2003 in Nasiriya and Istanbul. Moreover, two days later, on 13 March, at around 7:30pm, an individual, speaking in Spanish but with a noticeable Arab accent, called the regional broadcasting corporation Telemadrid to let its executives know of a video cassette left inside a litter bin near the so-called M-30 mosque, Madrid’s largest Islamic place of worship and community centre. On the tape, recorded minutes after 5:00pm that same day by the train bombers themselves, a hooded terrorist, dressed in white and holding a Sterling assault rifle, read a statement claiming responsibility for the train attacks on behalf of Abu Dujan al Afghani, presented as the spokesman of the military wing of Ansar al-Qaeda in Europe.
Outside Spain, the issue is certainly not whether the Madrid bombings were an expression of jihadist terrorism or the indiscriminate manifestation of Basque ethno-nationalist terrorism. There is an overwhelming consensus broadly attributing the commuter-train blasts to individuals associated with a radical Islamist orientation. The issue is rather the characteristics of those individuals and whether they are to be conceived as part of an amorphous and leaderless phenomenon or as part of a polymorphous and still more-often-than-not centrally led web of global terrorism. Were the Madrid bombings a case of home-grown, al-Qaeda-inspired terrorism or did those who prepared and executed the blasts have international connections with al-Qaeda or any of its affiliated organisations? Analysis of the Madrid bombing network, new evidence available about its ties with al- Qaeda’s command structures in North Waziristan, and an assessment of the strategy behind the commuter-trains blast support the second of these propositions.
Analysing the network
The network behind the 2004 Madrid train bombings came together between September 2002 and November 2003.15 First the desire and then the decision to perpetrate a terrorist attack in Spain led to the coalescing of four relatively small clusters of people. Two of these clusters were particularly interconnected, as they evolved from the remnants of an important al-Qaeda cell established in Spain around the middle of the 1990s. This jihadist cell was substantially, but not completely, dismantled during the months following 11 September 2001, when it was led by the Syrian-born Imad Eddin Barakat Yarkas, better known as Abu Dahdah.16 A third cluster was linked to the structure established that same decade by the Moroccan Islamist Combatant Group (MICG) across Western Europe, particularly in France and Belgium.17 The fourth cluster initially consisted of a gang of delinquents active throughout Spain who specialised in the trafficking of illicit drugs and stolen vehicles.18
Although the number of people directly or indirectly connected to the network may be larger, there are 27 individuals about whom there is both empirical evidence and legal grounds to implicate them in the preparation or execution of the 11 March attacks.19 These individuals comprise the 16 already tried and convicted (13 in Spain, two in Morocco and one in Italy) in relation to the blasts on the commuter trains; the seven who committed suicide on 3 April 2004; and four known fugitives, one of whom was handedbover to the Moroccan authorities after being arrested in Syria in 2007 and finally convicted in Rabat in January 2009 for involvement in the Madrid bombings. Not unexpectedly, all were men, born between 1960 and 1983. More than half were aged between 23 and 33 at the time of the train bombings. Most were native Moroccans, except for three Algerians, an Egyptian, a Tunisian and a Lebanese national.20 All but three were living in Spain, most of them in or around Madrid, when the attacks took place. Two, however, lived in Brussels and one in Milan. Typically, although not exclusively, they were economic migrants, some residing legally and others illegally. Many were single, although a significant number were married and a few even had children. Although their sociological profiles were quite diverse, they tended to show low levels of both formal education and occupational status. But those mobilised in the Madrid bombing network (which can hardly be considered a case of homegrown terrorism) did not all adopt jihadist ideology, become radicalised and be recruited in the same place, at the same time or through the same processes.21
Three of the 27 individuals implicated in the Madrid bombings were involved in the earlier al-Qaeda cell in Spain: Sarhane ben Abdelmajid Fakhet (better known as ‘The Tunisian’ because of his country of origin) and Jamal Zougam, both of whom played key roles in the attacks, and Said Berraj, also a prominent member of the network.22 The owner of the property in Chinchón rented by the terrorists as their base of operations was Mohamed Needel Acaid, a Syrian detained in November 2001 for his involvement in that same al-Qaeda cell and convicted in 2005.23 Allekema Lamari, one of the Leganés suicides, had indirect ties with the same cell. Initially arrested in Valencia in 1997 for membership in the Armed Islamic Group of Algeria (GIA) and later convicted, he was released from prison due to a judicial error in 2002. His GIA cell was led by Salaheddin Benyaich, also known as Abu Mugen, who was close to Abu Dahdah in those years. A classified report from the Centro Nacional de Inteligencia (CNI, the Spanish National Intelligence Centre) dated 6 November 2003 mentioned Lamari’s suspicious behaviour and mentioned reliable informants who considered he was likely to organise and execute an imminent act of terrorism in the country.24 A further classified CNI note, dated 15 March 2004, commented that after his release from the penitentiary he had ‘sworn that Spain would pay very dearly for his arrest’ and that ‘he even declared that he would commit acts involving arson or derailment’. The note also stressed that he knew well ‘Valencia, Tudela, Madrid and Alcalá de Henares’.25 Hassan el Haski and Youssef Belhadj, two prominent members of the MICG based in Belgium, were also among the 27 individuals involved in the Madrid bombing network. The former was very close to Abdelkader Hakimi, head of the MICG in Europe, well aware of the terrorist plans in Spain and an acquaintance of Jamal Zougam.26 Youssef Belhadj was also, according to the declaration of his nephew during the judicial investigation of the train attacks, a member of al-Qaeda.27 He frequently travelled to Madrid to meet his associates who had joined the local jihadist cell.28 On 3 March 2004 at 8:35pm, just eight days before the attacks, he flew back to Brussels from Madrid, where he had been for the previous month.29 Indeed, when the Belgian police arrested Belhadj they found two cellular phones in his Brussels bedroom. The one he regularly used operated with a pre-paid card acquired on 19 October 2003, the day after Osama bin Laden threatened Spain in a message aired on the Qatari-based television channel al-Jazeera, although it had been obtained with a false identity, with a fake 11 March 1921 date of birth.30 The second phone found in Belhadj’s bedroom, commonly used by his brother Mimoun, used another pre-paid card purchased shortly after the first and again obtained using a false identity, this time with 16 May as the fictitious date of birth. It may not have been coincidence that 16 May and 11 March were the dates of the 2003 Casablanca attacks – when a Spanish restaurant was targeted – and the planned date for the Madrid bombings, respectively.31 Similarly, 1921 may have been chosen as a reference to Sura 21 of the Koran, which alludes to the time when unbelievers ‘will not be able to ward off the fire from their faces, nor yet from their backs, and no help can reach them!’.
Another individual involved in the Madrid bombing network was Rabei Osman el Sayed Ahmed (known as ‘Mohamed the Egyptian’), a former member of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (merged with al-Qaeda in 2001). He spent at least five years in the Egyptian army and served in a brigade based in Port Said specialising in explosives. Confidential sources indicated to the Spanish authorities that Rabei Osman had been interned in the maximumsecurity penitentiary of Abu Zaa Abal, where those suspected or convicted of terrorist activities were usually imprisoned. He was an active al-Qaeda recruiter in Western Europe of people likely to become suicide terrorists. The Italian security forces secretly taped and filmed him doing just that in the flat where he lived in Milan before he was arrested in June 2004 because of his close links with some of the commuter-train bombers detained in Spain. Rabe Osman lived in Spain from 2002 to February 2003, during which, together with Fakhet, he was active in radicalising youngsters in and around mosques.32 As one of the Italian films clearly shows, in the course of indoctrinating a potential new recruit he claimed involvement in the Madrid bombings.33 Indeed, he opened and activated an e-mail account in a Yahoo server, inserting fictitious personal data, including 11 March 1970 as date of birth.34 Rabei Osman also knew in advance about the 11 March date. On 4 February 2004, following his return to Italy from a last trip to Spain before the attacks, In addition to the individuals already mentioned, and their associates, the Madrid bombing network also included several former delinquents, individuals who had been part of a gang regularly engaged in trafficking drugs and stolen cars before joining the jihadist network in summer 2003. Their boss Jamal Ahmidan (also known as ‘The Chinese’), however, was not a newcomer to jihadist circles. He had become radicalised by 1996, following four years of internment under a false identity in the Spanish penitentiary of Valdemoro, near Madrid, convicted of drug offences. His attitudes became even more extreme during a further period of imprisonment in Morocco between 2000 and June 2003.35 Prior to this, in 1999, Ahmidan met with Abu Dahdah, then leader of Spain’s al-Qaeda cell, in the Netherlands and expressed the desire to go and fight in Chechnya.36 Loyalty towards ‘The Chinese’, as the band’s lynchpin, seems to have been the key factor in the involvement in the commuter-train plot of this group of petty criminals.
An al-Qaeda connection
The clue that connects the Madrid bombing network to the al-Qaeda hierarchy appeared more than four years ago, although it was only confirmed over the last two months of 2009. It came to light in a remote mountainous location in northwestern Pakistan, not far from the Afghan border. In the early hours of 1 December 2005, a Hellfire missile hit a compound in the village of Haisori, close to Miran Shah, the administrative capital of Northern Waziristan, one of the seven agencies which form the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The core of al-Qaeda’s leadership, most of its commanders as well as many of its members and those of affiliated groups, relocated in FATA and the adjacent North West Frontier Province between late 2001 and the beginning of 2002. Al-Qaeda also relocated a large number of its active militants and most of its training infrastructure to North Waziristan between the middle of 2004 and the beginning of 2005,37 and has benefited from the protection afforded by Talibanised sectors of the indigenous Pashtun communities. The Hellfire, launched by one of the unmanned Predator drones used by the US Central Intelligence Agency to target al-Qaeda leaders and commanders detected along the frontier between Pakistan and Afghanistan, killed five people. Among them was Egyptian Hamza Rabia, then head of al-Qaeda’s external operations command and the man responsible for the organisation’s plots in North America and Western Europe. At the time of his death, Rabia was regarded as one of the top five (possibly top three) people at al-Qaeda’s core. Early in 2002, Osama bin Laden had split al-Qaeda’s operational structure into two commands. The internal operations command was assigned to Mustafa al Uzayti (also known as Abu Faraj al Libi), focusing on Afghanistan and Pakistan. Leadership of the external operations command was initially assigned to Khalid Sheik Mohamed, who masterminded the 11 September attacks in the United States. When Khalid Sheik Mohamed was arrested in Rawalpindi on March 2003, al Libi likewise became engaged in external operations, although command was assumed by Rabia.38
One of the four men who died with Rabia was identified by US intelligence, some weeks later, as Amer Azizi. A Moroccan, Azizi gained prominence as a member of the al-Qaeda cell established in Spain during the 1990s. Abu Dahdah, the leader of that cell after 1995, recruited Azizi and sent him to a training camp in Afghanistan perhaps as early as 2000, but certainly before mid-2001. Azizi was formally prosecuted in absentia by Spain’s National Court for terrorist offences attributed to that cell after he managed to escape from Spain following the police operation which substantially dismantled the cell in November 2001. While active in Spain’s al-Qaeda cell, Azizi forged close ties to individuals who later became key members of the Madrid bombing network. These included the network initiator, Mustafa Maymouni, now imprisoned in Morocco for the Casablanca attacks, as well as ‘The Tunisian’, Zougam and Berraj.
In the past there has been speculation that Azizi was the instigator of the attacks. But it was only in December 2008, when a Crown Court in Manchester convicted two British citizens of Pakistani extraction (under surveillance since 2005 and arrested in 2006), of being an important member of al-Qaeda and his acolyte, that indications that a terrorist with Azizi’s background was a key associate of Rabia emerged. This individual, called Ilyas, was mistakenly believed to be Mamoun Darkazanli. A British expert commented during the Manchester trial that Darkazanli was wanted in Spain for the Madrid bombings, which was not the case. Darkazanli, moreover, continues to live in Hamburg, Germany. Ilyas, however, is also one of the aliases used by Azizi. When Rabia was killed, his likely right-hand man Azizi died alongside him.39 According to senior American officials, information on the death of Azizi, as Rabia’s adjutant, was forwarded to the Spanish authorities informally in September 2006 and through a printed report in September 2007.40 Azizi is repeatedly mentioned in no less than 141 of the 241 volumes on the Madrid bombings compiled by the National Court in Spain. His name is also referred to in eight of the 30 supplementary volumes completing the vast judicial documentation on the case. Taken together, these documents, the result of specialised law-enforcement investigations and international police exchanges, reveal on the one hand the close ties between Azizi and the individuals who played pivotal roles in the formation and subsequent development of the local terrorist cell that prepared and placed the 11 March bombs, and on the other hand his links with individuals and groups from North Africa involved in the web of global terrorism. It was through these links that he ended up in positions of importance within al-Qaeda’s senior leadership. In fact, before becoming a key associate of Rabia, Azizi operated alongside Abd al Hadi al Iraqi and was already linked to Said al Masri and Khalid Habib, all senior al-Qaeda leaders.41 Back from his trip to Afghanistan in early summer 2001, Azizi coopted Maymouni, also a Moroccan, who became his closest collaborator. In 2002 Maymouni, at the instigation of Abdulatif Mourafik (also known as Malek el-Andalusi), a member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) who allegedly became an associate of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (later head of al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia), initiated the network that perpetrated the Madrid bombings, and first rented the Chinchón base of operations in October of that year.42 Maymouni was investigated by the Spanish police in 2003 following the Casablanca attacks.43 After he was detained and imprisoned in Morocco in May 2003, other members of the local cell rented the property again in January 2004.44 Another Moroccan, Driss Chebli, and ‘The Tunisian’ came to lead the network when Maymouni was arrested. Chebli himself was incarcerated in Spain four months later, after being implicated in the Abu Dahdah cell case, and ‘The Tunisian’ became the local ringleader of the terrorist network. As the criminal proceedings on the Madrid bombings have shown, ‘The Tunisian’ was also radicalised and recruited by Azizi.45 Azizi and ‘The Tunisian’ had ‘frequent contacts’ and communicated by e-mail in 2002 and 2003.46 A 2005 report from Spain’s central police intelligence unit stated that ‘it is true that Amer Azizi was a friend of Sarhane ben Abdelmajid Fakhet, and it is possible that he provided advice through the Internet and even interceded in favour of the terrorist project being prepared in Madrid’.47 The court records show close links between Azizi and other perpetrators of the train bombings such as Zougam and the still-fugitive Berraj.48
Following a formal request from the French authorities concerning Zougam, already suspected of jihadist terrorism activities in 2000, the Spanish police searched his home in Madrid in June 2001 and found written contact details for Azizi.49 Berraj was with Azizi in Turkey in 2000, possibly on their way to Afghanistan, when both took part in a meeting with other known jihadists such as Salahedin Benyaich and former Guatánamo inmate Lahcen Ikasrien, all of whom were arrested by the Turkish authorities.50 Azizi’s ties to al-Qaeda’s affiliated North African organisations were consolidated during his stay in Afghanistan. The Martyr Abu Yahyia camp where he trained, around 30km north of Kabul, was run by the LIFG. Members of the MICG were indoctrinated and trained there as well. Indeed, leaders of both organisations agreed, towards the end of the 1990s, to coordinate their activities.51 It was in the Martyr Abu Yahyia camp that Azizi met el-Andalusi and a fellow Moroccan, Karim el-Mejjati, an important al-Qaeda operative and terrorist organiser later killed by Saudi security forces. Indeed, el-Mejjati visited Spain in 2001 and met with Azizi.52 Thus, as a result of his stay in the camp, Azizi became attached to the LIFG while retaining strong links with, if not a kind of dual membership in, the MICG. The MICG became affiliated to, and supported by, al-Qaeda from the beginning of 2001, when its founder Nafia Noureddine met first with Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri, and then with Mohammed Atef (Abu Hafs al Masri).53 At a training facility established by the MICG near Jalalabad, in Afghanistan, militants acquired expertise in constructing remote-control detonators and in how to use cellular phones to activate improvised explosive devices.54 A meeting that delegates of the LIFG, the MICG and the analogous Tunisian organisation held in Istanbul is of the utmost significance to make full sense of the Madrid train bombings. The Istanbul meeting was held in February 2002, the Casablanca attacks were perpetrated in May 2003 and the Madrid train bombings occurred in March 2004. It was at the Istanbul meeting that it was decided the jihad should not be limited to conflict zones but should be carried into the countries from which members of the groups originated or in which they were residing.55 The identical argument had been disseminated within the emerging Madrid bombing network since at least autumn 2002.56 Several of the individuals implicated in the Casablanca attacks were also involved in the Madrid bombings. Moreover, before el- Andalusi instructed Maymouni to form a terrorist cell in Madrid, he had ordered him to set up another one, also in 2002, in Kenitra, Morocco.57 A Spanish police report prepared with contributions from some foreign security services, moreover, substantiates information on cell-phone exchanges between ‘The Tunisian’ and Abu Abdullah al-Sadeq, emir of the LIFG, then temporarily in East Asia, a few months prior to the attacks.58 Al-Sadeq was later arrested in Bangkok and handed over to the Libyan authorities.
An underlying strategy?
The will to perpetrate an act of jihadist terrorism in Spain dates to late 2001 and early 2002.59 It was initially motivated by revenge following a major police operation which dismantled and incarcerated most of the members of the al-Qaeda cell led by Abu Dahdah. It is no coincidence that three prominent members of the Madrid bombing network were tied to that cell. Soon afterwards, the desire to attack was enhanced by the determination expressed by the joint strategic decision adopted at the meeting in Istanbul in February 2002. The invasion of Iraq added a further motivation and provided an opportunity for those wishing to perpetrate a terrorist attack to converge. A good starting point for assessing the strategy underlying the 2004 Madrid bombings is the audio recording by Osama bin Laden aired by al-Jazeera in October 2003, in which he threatened Spain and five other countries (in addition to the United States), for having deployed soldiers in Iraq.60 On 26 October, an e-mail sent to the London-based al-Majallah weekly by Abu Muhammad al Ablaj (referred to by the paper as an important al- Qaeda figure) announced: ‘We are preparing for a great day’ in ‘a place in the Western countries’ mentioned by Osama bin Laden in his message, excluding the United States. A number of observers have been inclined to view the commuter-train blasts as inspired by two jihadist documents. One, ‘Jihad in Iraq: Hopes and Dangers’, contains a sophisticated argument on how to induce the United States’ coalition partners, in particular Spain, then a major European contributor, to pull their troops out of Iraq by striking at their soldiers, so that other countries might be expected to follow. The other document, ‘A Message to the Spanish People’, hinted at the possibility of an attack within Spain.61 However, by the time the former was promulgated in September 2003 and both were published on the Global Islamic Media Centre website in December, the Madrid bombing network was nearly complete and the decision to perpetrate a major attack already made. There are, moreover, no traces of either document having been viewed or downloaded through any of the computers used by the terrorists. The timing, sequence and contents of the communiqués claiming responsibility for the attacks are also interesting. Besides those issued on 11 and 13 March, a communiqué from the Abu Hafs al Masri Brigades/al-Qaeda appeared on 15 March (the day after the general election) and a second message from the local terrorist cell, whose members also recorded some unreleased videos on 27 March, was broadcast on 3 April. The 11 March communiqué by the Abu Hafs al Masri Brigades/al-Qaeda was sent by e-mail to the editor of Al Quds al Arabi who, on the basis of previous experience with other al-Qaeda claims received by the same newspaper, considered it authentic. The Spanish national police, which rated the communiqué as ‘relatively trustworthy’, corroborated how the e-mail was forwarded from Iran, though it could have technically originated in Yemen, Egypt or Libya.62 The text, written in Arabic, said among other things that: The death squad has managed to penetrate the bowels of Crusading Europe, striking one of the pillars of the Crusader alliance, Spain, with a painful blow. This is part of the settling of old scores with the Crusading Spain, the ally of America in its war against Islam. Where is America, Aznar? Who will protect you, Great Britain, Italy, Japan and other agents? When we struck against the Italian troops in Nasiriya we already sent a warning to America’s agents: withdraw from the alliance against Islam. It thus claimed responsibility for the attacks and justified them by referring to Spain both as an ally of the United States and as a country with which there was a score to settle. This might well allude to the Muslim territory on the Iberian Peninsula lost to the Christians in the fifteenth century, to the persecution and imprisonment of many al-Qaeda members and followers in Spain since autumn 2001, or both. The issue of Iraq is framed in the broader terms of armed religious confrontation, and the Spanish prime minister is mentioned as the personification of that policy. The Nasiriya attacks of 12 November 2003 were also attributed to al-Qaeda by Abu Muhammad al Ablaj in an e-mail sent nine days later to al-Majallah. One of the bombers in those attacks was recruited and travelled to Iraq through the same transnational network that helped some of those implicated in the Madrid blasts to escape from Spain.63 However, there appeared to be no implicit or explicit allusion in this initial communiqué to the general elections to be held on 14 March. The message does include a clear demand, reiterating the notion of a clash between religions, to citizens of the West as opposed to their ruling elites: ‘The people of the allies of the United States should force their governments to end this alliance in the war against terrorism, which means the war against Islam. If you stop the war, we shall stop ours’. Although the invasion and occupation of Iraq were overwhelmingly unpopular in Spain and had became a major electoral issue, the terrorists might have been seeking to affect Spanish public opinion in general, to influence governmental foreign-policy decisions, rather than voting behaviour in particular. The videotape released on 13 March by the local cell included statements such as ‘we declare our responsibility for what happened in Madrid exactly two and a half years after the attacks on New York and Washington’ and ‘we swear by the Almighty that if you do not halt in your injustice and in the deaths of Moslems with the excuse of combating terrorism, we shall blow your houses up in the air and spill your blood as if it were a river. We are prepared for what will fill your hearts with terror.’ Although the terrorists did not refer to the general elections, the tape was hurriedly recorded at around 5:00pm on the eve of election day and delivered in time for nationwide release by the media. After the 14 March election, the extent to which the local cell in Madrid followed the directives issued by Abu Hafs al Masri Brigades/al-Qaeda from the Gulf became clear. On 17 March, a fax signed by the latter organisation and dated 15 March was received in another London-based Arabic-language newspaper, Al Hayat, and also sent by e-mail to Al Quds al Arabiya. This communiqué mentioned both the elections and the electoral outcome when explaining why the initial claim of responsibility had appeared with unusual speed: ‘In the case of the battle of Madrid, the time factor was very important to finish with the government of the contemptible Aznar’, and added that ‘we have given the Spanish people the choice between war and peace, and they have chosen peace by voting for the party that stood up against the American alliance in its war against Islam’. Clearly alluding to Spain’s Islamic past, as well as to the incoming government, it announced that our leadership has decided to halt all operations on the soil of Al Andalus against what are known as civilian targets until we are sure of the direction the new government will take, that has promised to withdraw Spanish troops from Iraq, and thereby make sure that there is no interference by the new executive in matters concerning Moslems. For this reason we reiterate the decision to all battalions on European soil to cease operations.
This communiqué was posted on the Global Islamic Media Centre website on 18 March, as ‘Notification for the Nation regarding the suspension of operations in the land of Al Andalus’. It was downloaded the following morning at 10:16am to a portable computer found by the Spanish police in the home of Jamal Ahmidan, ‘The Chinese’.64 This explains the second message from the local cell (once more presented as coming from Abu Dujan al-Afgani) on 3 April, hours before the suicide explosion in Leganés. This message was hand-written by ‘The Tunisian’65 and faxed to the national newspaper ABC in Madrid, with the warning that ‘we, the Death Battalion, announce the annulment of our previous truce’, threatening Spaniards with ‘making your country an inferno and making your blood flow like rivers’ unless certain demands, including the withdrawal of troops from Iraq and Afghanistan, were met within 24 hours by the ‘people and Government of Spain’.66 But it was not the local cell but rather the Abu Hafs al Masri Brigades/al-Qaeda that had declared the truce this message was now terminating. The local cell in Madrid seems always to have accepted the premises transmitted in advance by the Abu Hafs al Masri Brigade/al-Qaeda from the Gulf.67 Whether they directed the local cell to end the truce or the decision was adopted autonomously (though in line with the 15 March communiqué) is uncertain. However, in the message faxed 3 April, the local cell leader established a 24-hour deadline, whereas in a video he and other terrorists recorded on 27 March that was never released, the deadline was fixed at eight days. So at least as early as 27 March, days after the new government expressed its intention to withdraw Spanish troops from Iraq but increase the number of soldiers in Afghanistan, the Madrid bombers clearly had it in mind to perpetrate a new act of terrorism on or after 4 April. Al-Qaeda’s leaders seem to have been more restrained than other global terrorists in exploiting the 2004 Madrid bombings for propaganda purposes.68 Osama bin Laden first mentioned them a month later in an audio recording broadcast by Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya on 15 April in which he offered a peace treaty to the Europeans. In this message, the commuter-train blasts were interpreted from a Muslim defence angle: ‘There is a lesson regarding what happens in occupied Palestine and what happened on September 11 and March 11. These are your goods returned to you.’69 On 16 November 2005, top al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri alluded to the 11 March attacks in a video praising the suicide bombings of 7 July 2005 in London as ‘the blessed raid which, like its illustrious predecessors in New York, Washington and Madrid, took the battle to the enemy’s own soil’.70 Not until 19 January 2006, when a new video recording was aired by Al Jazeera, did bin Laden again refer to the case, this time indirectly and in conjunction with the London bombings: ‘The war against America and its allies has not remained limited to Iraq, as Bush claims. Evidence of this is the explosions you have witnessed in the capitals of the most important European countries that are members of this hostile coalition.’ 71 Since September 2008, al-Qaeda has frequently introduced graphic material from the commuter-train blasts to illustrate the actions of its global jihad. These images are now being reproduced in propaganda videos by al- Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb as well. * * * It is no accident that the sentence in the Madrid bombing case refers to all those individuals prosecuted and convicted for the attacks as ‘members of terrorist cells and groups of jihadist type’.72 In contrast to the conventional wisdom, in this important judicial document there is not a single mention of ‘local cells’, ‘independent cells’, ‘independent local cells’ or similar concepts. Indeed, what the commuter-train bombings revealed about al-Qaeda and global terrorism two-and-a-half years after the 11 September attacks in the United States, is far more dynamic and complex. In the broadest sense, what happened in Madrid was telling about al-Qaeda’s continued activity in instigating, approving and probably facilitating spectacular acts of terrorism in the West, particularly in Europe. This activity continues, even if there has been a noticeable change in the scope and limitations of al-Qaeda’s capabilities. The commuter-train blasts also shed light on the re-orientation from 2002 onwards of al-Qaeda’s affiliated North African organisations, leading to the recent constitution of an al-Qaeda regional extension in the Maghreb. In a more detailed sense, the attacks spoke volumes about the mobilisation, within open societies, of firstgeneration Muslim immigrants as terrorists. This adds to the radicalisation and recruitment of second- and third-generation immigrants elsewhere. Overall, the Madrid train bombings revealed much about global terrorism as a polymorphous phenomenon, with diverse and heterogeneous interacting components whose leaders recognise a top-down hierarchy of command and control, but which is flexible and adapted to specific circumstances, producing extraordinary combinations when necessary and allowing the strategies of international actors and the aspirations of local activists to converge at the operational level.
But the attacks of 11 March 2004 illuminate not just jihadist terrorism in transition. They also shed light on the changing nature of the threat. They were not planned, prepared or executed by al-Qaeda alone. Neither were they the product of autonomous self-constituted cells. The Madrid bombing network speaks for itself as a complex, composite source of threat, where individuals from different groups and organisations converge. The blasts also point to the terrorists’ lasting predilection for public-transport systems as soft targets, their preference for the use of improvised explosive devices and their suicidal determination. Finally, the Madrid attacks reveal much about terrorist strategy. Al-Qaeda’s broad guidelines, decisions adopted by associated organisations and the subordinate vision of local cells can converge to make the best of favourable opportunities.
*Fernando Reinares is Professor of Political Science and Security Studies at Universidad Rey Juan Carlos in Madrid, and Co-Director of the Program on Global Security and Senior Analyst on International Terrorism at Real Instituto Elcano.
Notes:
1 The criminal proceedings over the Madrid train bombings accumulated 241 volumes and 30 separate pieces, including previously secret records and reserved documents, comprising a total of 93,226 pages of files (Sumario 20/2004). In addition, available documentation includes sentences handed down by the National Court and the Supreme Court, as well as data from related criminal proceedings and sentences delivered in Milan, Italy and Salé, Morocco.
2 Audiencia Nacional, Juzgado Central de Instrucción no. 6, Sumario 20/2004, vol. 161, pp. 60,764 and 60,771.
3 Sumario 20/2004, vol. 68, p. 20,629 and vol. 161, p. 60,767.
4 Ibid., vol. 161, p. 60,858.
5 Audiencia Nacional, Sala de lo Penal, Sección Segunda, Sentencia 65/2007, pp. 229–422.
6 On the immediate material damages, see Sumario 20/2004, vol. 216, p. 84,062. On the direct economic costs, see Mikel Buesa, Aurelia Vilariño, Joost Heijs, Thomas Baumert and Javier González, ‘The Economic Cost of March 11: Measuring the Direct Economic Cost of the Terrorist Attack on March 11, 2004 in Madrid’, Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 19, no. 4, Winter 2007, pp. 489–509.
7 Sumario 20/2004, vol. 162, pp. 61,522–4.
8 Ibid., separate piece 29, annex II, document 8, and annex IV, document 2. It should be noted that the terrorists always made rental arrangements using falsified identity documents.
9 Ibid., separate piece 29, annex II, documents 15 and 16. 10 On the financing of the Madrid train bombings, see Sumario 20/2004, separate piece 10.
11 Rogelio Alonso and Fernando Reinares, ‘Maghreb Immigrants becoming Suicide Terrorists. A Case Study of Religious Radicalization Processes in Spain’, in Ami Pedahzur (ed.), Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism: The Globalization of Martyrdom (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 179–97.
12 ‘This is my testament’, wrote a member of the local cell, before the attacks, to his close relatives. In the letter, he insists on jihad as ‘an obligation for the faithful’, adding first that ‘I cannot live in this world, humiliated and weakened before the eyes of infidels and tyrants’, and then a wish for his sons and daughters: ‘My wish is for them to be religiously wise and mujahedeen’. He concludes: ‘I have chosen death as the path for life’. Sumario 20/2004, vol. 61, p. 18,591; vol. 81, pp. 18,634 and 25,176; and vol. 162, pp. 61,529–30, 61,556–8.
13 Ignacio Lago and José R. Montero, The 2004 Election in Spain: Terrorism, Accountability, and Voting, working paper no. 253 (Barcelona: Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials, 2006).
14 Abdel Bari Atwan, The Secret History of Al-Qa’ida (London: Abacus, 2007), p. 116.
15 Sumario 20/2004, vol. 97, p. 31,840.
16 This cell was detected by the police at the end of 1994. Among its founding members were Anwar Adnan Mohamed Saleh, also known as Chej Salah, who moved from Madrid to Peshawar in October 1995, and Mustafa Setmarian Nasar, better known as Abu Musab al Suri, who relocated to London four months earlier and then settled close to Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan. The cell was connected to the Hamburg cell that spawned the 11 September attacks. Abu Dahdah had been in contact with Mohammed Atta since the early 1990s. Abu Dahdah and 17 other individuals were convicted of terrorism-related offences by the National Court on 26 September 2005. Fifteen of these convictions were confirmed by the Supreme Court on 31 May 2006.
17 On the MICG and its links with the Madrid train bombings, see the comprehensive police report in Sumario 20/2004, vol. 97, pp. 31,838–72.
18 Sumario 20/2004, vol. 17, pp. 4,426–7 and vol. 191, pp. 74,612–13.
19 For legal and ethical reasons no mention is made here of persons who were detained following the attacks but never charged, or prosecuted but absolved of all charges. Others, convicted for dealing with stolen explosives that ended up in the hands of the terrorists, were not part of the jihadist network as such and are excluded from this analysis.
20 The Moroccans include Hassan el Haski, Youssef Belhadj, Mohamed Larbi ben Sellam, Jamal Ahmidan, Said Berraj, Mohamed Afalah, Jamal Zougam, Othman el Gnaoui, Fouad el Morabit Anghar, Saed el Harrak, Mohamed Bouharrat, Rachid Aglif, Abdelmajid Bouchar, Rifaat Anouar Asrih, Abdenabi Kounjaa, Mohamed Oulad Akcha, Rachid Oulad Akcha, Abdelilah Hriz, Mohamed Belhadj, Hamid Ahmidan and Hicham Ahmidan. The Algerians are Allekema Lamari, Daoud Ouhnane and Nasreddine Bousbaa. The Egyptian is Rabei Osman el Sayed Ahmed. The one Tunisian is Serhane ben Abdelmajid Fakhet and the one Lebanese is Mahmoud Slimane Aoun.
21 Fernando Reinares, ‘Jihadist Radicalization and the 2004 Madrid Bombing Network’, CTC Sentinel. vol. 2, Issue 11, 2009, pp. 16–19.
22 Fakhet, Zougam and Berraj were all investigated by the National Court over the al-Qaeda cell led by Abu Dahdah. See Sumario 20/2004, vol. 163, pp. 61,694–700, 61,735–44 and 61,781–801.
23 The real estate was registered under the name of his wife. See Sumario 20/2004, vol. 161, p. 60,823.
24 Sumario 20/2004, separate piece 11, pp. 790–93.
25 Ibid., pp. 793–4.
26 Ibid., vol. 97, pp. 31,898–9, and vol. 163, pp. 61,580–608. The Madrid bombing sentencing document refers to Hassan el Haski as a ‘leader of the Moroccan Islamic Combattant Group’. See Sentencia 65/2007, pp. 217 and 218. See also Tribunal de grande Instance de Paris, 16eme chamber/1, no. d’affaire 0313739016, jugement of 11 July 2007, p.p 55 and 73.
27 Sumario 20/2004, vol. 163, p. 61,627. Youssef Belhadj is defined in one document as a ‘member of one of the groups which form the al-Qaeda network’. Sentencia 65/2007, p. 215.
28 Sumario 20/2004, vol. 106, pp. 35,601– 14; vol. 115, pp. 39,970–73; vol. 133, p. 48,728–33, and vol. 163, pp. 61,608–24. 29 Ibid., vol. 180, p. 69,863.
30 Ibid., vol. 163, pp. 61,622–3; see also Sentencia 65/2007, pp. 216–17.
31 Sumario 20/2004, vol. 163, pp. 61,621–2.
32 Rabei Osman es Sayed Ahmed had been investigated by the national police’s antiterrorism branch in 2002 (Sumario 20/2004, vol. no. 17, p. 4,412; vol. 79, p. 24,154; vol. 81, p. 25,039, and vol. 163, pp. 61,643–63.
33 On 26 May 2004, while indoctrinating a young acolyte in his Milan apartment, he was taped as saying: ‘Listen, Yahya, be careful and do not speak. The whole Madrid operation was an idea of mine. They were among my most loved friends, fallen as martyrs, may Allah have mercy on them … This operation required many lessons and lots of patience over two and a half years.’ During the same radicalising speech, Ahmed asserted: ‘You have to join the al-Qaeda ranks. This is the solution, since the doors of al-Qaeda are open.’ Sumario 20/2004, vol. 163, pp. 61,650. Also Corte d’Assise di Milano, Sentenza 10/2006, p. 44.
34 Ibid., vol. 79, p. 24,191; vol. 163, p. 61,654. Also Corte d’Assise di Milano, Sentenza 10/2006, pp. 21–22.
35 Ibid., vol. 14, p. 3,632.
36 Audiencia Nacional, Sala de lo Penal, Sección Segunda, Sentencia 65/2007, p. 201.
37 Rohan Gunaratna and Anders Nielsen, ‘Al Qaeda in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan and Beyond’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 31, no. 9, September 2008, pp. 786–8.
38 Ibid., pp. 780, 783.
39 Oral confirmation to author by CIA sources present in Pakistan during the Haisori strike, and written confirmation from Spain’s police intelligence in November and December 2009.
40 Confirmed by personal oral communication from a senior CIA official on 23 December 2009 and in writing from Spain’s national police central counter-terrorism branch on 2 March 2010.
41 Written communication from Spain’s national police intelligence chief, 26 November 2009.
42 When Azizi escaped, Maymouni was ordered by Mourafik to go to Morocco, where Azizi’s wife, Raquel Burgos (a Spanish convert) had moved shortly after the disappearance of her husband, and help her to rejoin him, first in Turkey and then in Pakistan. See Sumario 20/2004, pp. 74,600–01. During its autumn 2009 offensive in South Waziristan, the Pakistani Army found and exhibited to the international press a passport belonging to Raquel Burgos, next to the passport of Said Bahaji, a German citizen and associate of the lead 9/11 hijacker Mohammed Atta. See http://afpak. foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/10/30/ daily_brief_passports_linked_to_911_ found_in_northwest_pakistan_military_ operations.
43 Investigated under Sumario 9/2003. See Sumario 20/2004, vol. 17, p. 4,423 and vol. 21, p. 5,583.
44 Sumario 20/2004, vol. 161, p. 60,823 and vol. 163, p. 61,726.
45 Ibid., vol. 163, pp. 61,740.
46 Testimony of a protected witness during the Madrid bombing trials at Spain’s National Court, Sumario 20/2004, vol. 114, p. 39514, and vol. 163, pp. 61,923-4.
47 Sumario 20/2004, vol. 161, p. 60,875.
48 Ibid., vol. 17, p. 4,414.
49 Ibid., vol. 163, pp. 61,784 and 61,679.
50 Ibid., vol. 17, p. 4,414 and vol. 193, p. 61,685.
51 Evan F. Kohlman, ‘Dossier: Libyan Islamic Fighting Group’, The NEFA Foundation, 2007, pp. 13–15, http:// www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/ nefalifg1007.pdf.
52 Sumario 20/2004, vol. 97, p. 31,345.
53 Peter L. Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I know (New York: Free Press, 2006), p. 279.
54 See Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, 16eme chamber/1, no. d’affaire 0313739016, jugement of 11 July 2007, p. 38, and Sumario 20/2004, vol. 191, p. 74,612.
55 An intelligence note of 17 December 2004 about this meeting and the strategic decision adopted is incorporated in the Madrid bombings criminal proceedings. See Sumario 20/2004, vol. 97, pp. 31,848 and 32,316
56 Audiencia Nacional, Juzgado Central de Instrucción 6, Auto of 5 July 2006, pp. 64–5.
57 Sumario 20/2004, vol. 97, p. 31,840.
58 Ibid., vol. 233, pp. 90,742–6.
59 This idea was also stressed by the public prosecutor’s office during the Madrid bombings case, as reflected in its final report submitted on 4 June 2007 by the public prosecutor to the Sala de lo Penal (Criminal Hall) at the National Court, pp. 12 and 13.
60 The other five countries were United Kingdom, Australia, Poland, Japan and Italy.
61 Brynjar Lia and Thomas Hegghammer, ‘Jihadi Strategic Studies: The Alleged Al Qaeda Policy Study Preceding the Madrid Bombings’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 27, no. 5, September– October 2004, pp. 355–75.
62 Sumario 20/2004, vol. 17, p. 4,405.
63 See Audiencia Nacional, Sala de lo Penal, Sección Primera, Sentencia 3/2010, p. 7.
64 Ibid., vol. 13, p.59,062; vol. 149, p. 56,763; vol. 156, p. 9,062, and vol. 161, p. 61,016.
65 Ibid., vol. 161, p. 60,872.
66 It also explains the contents of several video recordings made by the local cell on 27 March but not made public, where its ringleader announced the ending of the truce. See ibid., vol. 161, p. 60,873 and vol. 162, pp. 61,538–40. 67 In their general report on the Madrid bombings, the Spanish police state: ‘There is an assumed relationship between the Abu Hafs al Masri Brigades and the terrorist commando itself which acted in Madrid’, since there is an observable coincidence not only in ‘the form they called the operative group’ but also because in ending the truce ‘the terrorist commando of Madrid acted in consonance’ with the 17 March communiqué. Sumario 20/2004, vol. 161, p. 60,920.
68 Manuel R. Torres, ‘Spain as an Object of Jihadist Propaganda’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 32, no. 11, November 2009, pp. 940–41.
69 A translation of this audio recording is available at http://www.memri.org/ bin/articles.cgi?Area=sd&ID=SP69504.
70 See http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ middle_east/4443364.stm.
71 A translation of this audio recording is available at http://memri.org/bin/ latestnews.cgi?ID=SD107406.
72 Sentencia 65/2007, p. 172.
The Jihad "Istanbul declaration" and the Gaza Flotilla
1. The violent nature of the flotilla and the events on board the Turkish ship Mavi Marmara should not have come as a surprise if anyone would have "connected the dots" before the takeover of the ship by the Israeli navy seals.
2. The Gaza flotilla initiative was a step in the implementation of the Jihadi "Istanbul declaration", which was issued at a conference held in Istanbul on 14-15 February 2009 under the title, "Gaza victory". Around 200 Arab and European Sunni sheikhs and clerics, as well as members of Hamas attended the conference – 90 of them signed the declaration (see appendix). According to a BBC reporter who attended the event, "speaker after speaker called for jihad against Israel in support of Hamas".[1] The Istanbul declaration set the ideological Jihadi confrontational violent formula for future materialization of its decisions, as demonstrated in the events of the flotilla to Gaza. The Gaza Flotilla initiative must be linked and understood within the radical pan-Islamic context and the mindset as reflected by its initiators in light of the Istanbul declaration and the 90 radical Muslim scholars and clerics from around the world who publicly sanctioned the legitimacy and support of Hamas and its military actions.
3. The Jihadi Istanbul Declaration affirmed "The obligation of the Islamic Nation to find a fair formula of reconciliation between the sons of the Palestinian people, under whose responsibility a legitimate authority will be formed that will attend to the fixed norms and the legitimate and national rights; and will carry on with the jihad and Resistance against the occupier until the liberation of all Palestine.” It also affirmed "The obligation of the Islamic Nation to open the crossings -- all crossings -- in and out of Palestine permanently, in order to allow access to all the needs of the Palestinians -- money, clothing, food, medicine, weapons and other essentials, so that they are able to live and perform the jihad in the way of Allah Almighty.” Additional affirmation has noted that: "We affirm that the victory that Allah accomplished by means of our brothers the Mujahidin, our defiant and steadfast kinsfolk in Gaza, was indeed achieved through His favor and help - exalted be He! It was also achieved through fulfilling the religious obligation of jihad in His way."
4. According to the Istanbul declaration, there is an obligation for "the Islamic Nation to regard the sending of foreign warships into Muslim waters, claiming to control the borders and prevent the smuggling of arms to Gaza, as a declaration of war, a new occupation, sinful aggression, and a clear violation of the sovereignty of the Nation". It continues: "This must be rejected and fought by all means and ways."[2]
The Istanbul Declaration signatories and their involvement in the flotilla
Several participants on board the violent ship Mavi Marmara were identified as participants and signatories of the Jihadi Istanbul declaration and their personal involvement in the flotilla demonstrates their commitment to the Jihadi cause by posing themselves as a leading model.
Muhammad Kazem Sawalha - one of the flotilla's organizers (Sawalha did not personally paticipate in the flotilla), and formerly a high-ranking fHamas commander of the Iz A-Din Al Qassam Brigades residing and active in the UK, appears in the signatory list at number 72.[3] It is worth mentioning a statement made by Muhammad Sawalha, the senior Hamas operative in Britain who was involved in launching the previous aid flotilla (“Lifeline 3”). According to Sawalha’s statement, the next aid convoy will avoid an “unwanted confrontation” with the Egyptian authorities, which happened last time. Next time, said Sawalha, “the confrontation will be directly with the Zionist enemy itself on the high seas” (Al-Intiqad, Hezbollah’s website, January 17, 2010).
Walid Al-Tabtabai - prominent flotilla activist from Kuwait who appears as a signatory on the Istanbul declaration (number 88) is known to support armed resistance in Palestine and in Iraq. At a press conference in Antalya, Turkey, the flotilla organizers asked all the participants to "write their wills." Following the press conference, Walid Al-Tabtabai reportedly "did not hesitate to write his will, in defiance of the Israeli threats".[4]
Sheikh Muhammad al-Hazimi, appears as a signatory on the Istanbul Declaration (number 66), a member of the Yemeni Parliament and of Al-Islah (the Yemini reform bloc), was photographed on the deck of the Mavi Marmara brandishing his large, curved dagger.
Other prominent radical Islamic participants in the flotilla
The Arab-Israeli Sheikh Ra'ed Salah, head of the northern branch of the Islamic Movement in Israel, is a radical Islamist whose participation in the flotilla on board the Mavi Marmara was no coincidence. He is one of the founders and a board member of the Union of Good and he maintains close ties with the Hamas leadership and supports its activities through material support and past funding to Hamas charitable organizations in the West Bank.[5]
The Yemeni Al Islah party sent three members to participate in the flotilla on board the violent ship. The Islah party runs the radical Islamic Al Islah charitable organization is also part of the Union of Good and known to be committed to the Jihad struggle of Hamas and is designated by Israel and the USA. It should be noted that the Yemeni Al Islah organization is lead by sheikh Abd Al Majid Zindani, a radical Islamist linked to Al Qaeda and Bin Laden, designated by the USA in 1995 as a terrorist, accused in 2004 of supplying weapons to al Qaeda and is known to be linked and involved in the preparations of Omar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the Christmas 2009 Detroit failed airline bombing attempt.
Possible involvement of the Union of Good
In a retrospective analysis, which is based on open-source material, some of which had been published prior to the flotilla’s violent events, one can conclude with a high degree of certainty that the Union of Good, as a radical Islamic umbrella worldwide coalition of Islamic charities, was assigned to carry out and implement the Istanbul declaration's action items to break the Israeli siege on Gaza. The Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader Sheikh Yusuf al-Qardawi who sanctioned in 2002 the legitimacy of suicide bombings against Israeli civilians, as well as numerous notorious and hateful Fatwas against Israel and the Jews, runs this collection of charities. The Union of Good was outlawed by Israel and is a designated entity by the U.S. Treasury Department due to its fund-raising activities on behalf of Hamas and the Hamas-controlled front charitable organizations in the West Bank and Gaza. The Union of Good has an international web of connections in the Arab and the Islamic world, as well as in Muslim communities in the West, which enables it to set the logistic infrastructure, funds and recruits in a relatively short period of time.
The Turkish IHH which, is part of the Union of Good, was set as the leading, prominent organization among the coalition organizations participating in the aid flotilla scheduled to arrive in the Gaza Strip. The Turkish IHH (Insani Yardim Vakfi, IHH, “humanitarian relief fund”) is known to be a radical Islamic organization, which was established in 1992 and formally registered in Istanbul in 1995. The IHH (outlawed by Israel in 2008) is part of the Union of Good, and seems to have been chosen to lead the Jihadi violent flotilla to Gaza. The Arab-Israeli Sheikh Ra'ed Salah’s participation in the flotilla on board the Mavi Marmara was no coincidence. He is one of the founders and a board member of the Union of Good and he maintains close ties with the Hamas leadership and supports its activities through material support and past funding to Hamas charitable organizations in the West Bank.
The Yemeni Al Islah party, which sent three members to participate in the flotilla on board the violent ship, runs the radical Islamic Al Islah charitable organization, which is also a member organization within the Union of Good and known to be committed to the Jihad struggle of Hamas and designated by Israel and the USA. Organizing the flotilla to Gaza necessitated a long series of preparations and a vast mobilization system which maintained contact with hundreds of organizations and operatives around the globe, most of them affiliated with radical Islam and the Muslim Brotherhood, and some of them pro-Palestinian from Western relief organizations. One can not rule out the possibility of the Union of Good, as a pan-Islamic organization with some of its associated members having participated in the Istanbul conference and the Union of Good as a pan-Islamic pro-Hamas umbrella organization, were commissioned and designated to serve as a platform had presumably supported the logistic preparations and mobilized recruits.
Appendix Text of the Istanbul Declaration and signatories:
http://www.standcampaign.org/wiki/index.php?title=Istanbul_Declaration
In the name of Allah the Most-merciful the All-merciful the statement by the religious scholars and proselytisers (du’a) of the Islamic Nation (ummah) to all rulers and peoples concerning events in Gaza Praise to Allah who strengthened His troops, aided His servants and alone routed the Zionist Jews, who says, ‘It was incumbent on Us to aid the believers.’ [Quran 30:47] And blessing and peace be on the Imam of the mujahidin who says, ‘There will remain a group of my Ummah adhering to the truth, and those who oppose them will not harm them until Allah’s command comes.’ [Hadith]
(And now to our topic).
This statement is addressed to the Islamic Nation, its religious scholars, its rulers and its peoples. In it we congratulate the whole family of Islam on the manifest victory which Allah has granted us in the land of Gaza, a land of pride and dignity, over the Zionist Jewish occupiers. Allah has appointed it as the first step in the complete victory for all of Palestine and the holy places of the Muslims. Furthermore, we herein emphatically affirm various resolutions and judgments.
I. Affirmation of the following unequivocal resolutions:
1. We affirm that the victory that Allah accomplished by means of our brothers the mujahidin, our defiant and steadfast kinsfolk in Gaza, was indeed achieved through His favor and help - exalted be He! It was also achieved through fulfilling the religious obligation of jihad in His way. This is a confirmation of His statement - sublime is He! - ‘How often a small party overcame a large party, by Allah’s leave.’ [Quran, 2:249]
2. We affirm that this manifest victory has clearly disclosed the volume of international and local military and political conspiracy against the jihad and the mujahidin in Gaza, as represented by the following: • Military co-operation in tightening the blockade and closing the crossings to the people of Gaza, especially the Rafah crossing. • Public or quasi-public support for the enemy. • The prevention of demonstrations and popular events held in support of the mujahidin; the arrest, trial and severe punishments of those who instigate them. • The aggressive pressure put on the mujahidin to break their will and force them to agree to their [the conspirators] terms and the stipulations of the Zionist enemy. • The attempt to present the Hamas government as the cause of this malicious Jewish Zionist war over Gaza. • The absence of any official and effective Arab and Islamic stance and its weakness in reflecting the will of the Arab and Islamic peoples to help our brothers in Gaza win. This indicates the width of the gap between the Nation and those rulers who lead it. • The use of funds for reconstruction and aid to those hurt as a negative pressure card on the mujahidin to abandon their legitimate demands, or some of them. • The prevention of delivery of aid and reconstruction funds to the Hamas government and the reliable authorities in Gaza; deeming the Palestinian Authority, represented by the presidency of Abbas and the Fayyad government, the sole representative of the Palestinian people, without the Hamas government; and the delivery of such funds and aid to increase their grip on the legitimate elected government of Hamas. This redoubles the suffering of the people of Gaza at the time they mostly need those funds and aid.
3. We affirm in full conviction that the Palestinian Authority, whose mandate is coming to an end, is not eligible to represent the Palestinian people. It stands outside the will of its people, and has given up the choice of jihad in the way of Allah Almighty as an effective means in defeating the occupation and the liberation of the Islamic holy places. It adopts the wishes of the Nation’s enemies in exchange for the illusions of false peace. 4. We affirm in full conviction that the so-called Arab peace initiative is a proven betrayal of the Islamic Nation and the Palestinian cause, and a blatant betrayal of the Palestinian people. It aims to criminalise the Resistance [muqawama] against the Zionist occupying entity in perpetuity through its de facto recognition of it, as well as the confiscation of the right of refugees to return to their homes and their property.
II. Affirmation of the following legal judgments:
1. The obligation of the Islamic Nation to rush to the aid of the people in Gaza; to rebuild what the Zionist aggression destroyed; to compensate the injured and support the widows, orphans, those suffering permanent disabilities, and the old and infirm.
2. The obligation of the Islamic Nation to restrict itself to dealing only with the legitimate elected Palestinian government (Hamas) in the delivery of aid and reconstruction of dwellings. It is the sole government authorised to do that by reason of its official legitimacy as well as its maintaining the Resistance against the Jewish Zionist occupation, its integrity, and its solidarity with the people in all circumstances.
3. The obligation of the Islamic Nation not to recognise the Palestinian Authority, whose mandate is ending, as representative of the Palestinian people. It must not elect it again, in view of its proven financial and administrative corruption as well as its squandering of time and assets behind the false peace process. It is also necessary to work seriously to choose a new authority that will guard the Palestinian ranks, respect their will and their right to resist the occupation, and work for the complete liberation of its land and holy places.
4. The obligation of the Islamic Nation to circulate a declaration to withhold aid funds from the undeserving or placing them in the hands of those who are not trustworthy. It must regard this as a legal betrayal that should be prosecuted, and punish those who cause mayhem, negligence and waste of these moneys.
5. The obligation of the Islamic Nation to find a fair formula of reconciliation between the sons of the Palestinian people, under whose responsibility a legitimate authority will be formed that will attend to the fixed norms and the legitimate and national rights; and will carry on with the jihad and Resistance against the occupier until the liberation of all Palestine.
6. The obligation of the Islamic Nation to open the crossings -- all crossings -- in and out of Palestine permanently, in order to allow access to all the needs of the Palestinians -- money, clothing, food, medicine, weapons and other essentials, so that they are able to live and perform the jihad in the way of Allah Almighty. The closure of the crossings or the prevention of the entry of weapons through them should be regarded as high treason in the Islamic Nation, and clear support for the Zionist enemy.
7. The obligation of the Islamic Nation to regard everyone standing with the Zionist entity, whether countries, institutions or individuals, as providing a substantial contribution to the crimes and brutality of this entity; the position towards him is the same as towards this usurping entity.
8. The obligation of the Islamic Nation to regard the sending of foreign warships into Muslim waters, claiming to control the borders and prevent the smuggling of arms to Gaza, as a declaration of war, a new occupation, sinful aggression, and a clear violation of the sovereignty of the Nation. This must be rejected and fought by all means and ways. To conclude: the Nation’s scholars and proselytisers remind the Islamic Nation, rulers and ruled alike, of the necessity of returning to its religion, adhering to the book of its Lord and the sunna of his Prophet, working for its unity, and seizing control of the instruments of power that will make possible its supremacy and the preservation of its holy places and provisions ‘Allah prevails in his purpose, but most people know not.’ [Quran, 12: 21]).
The Signatories as presented in the Declaration:
1) Sheikh Ahmad Sulaiman Ahif, Yemen
2) Dr. Ahmad al-Ghamidi, Saudi Arabia
3) Dr. Ahmad al-Misbahi, Yemen
4) Sheihk Ahmad abdul Razzaq al-Raqihi, Yemen
5) Proselytiser [da’iya] Ahmad Muhammad Abdullah, Egypt
6) Sheikh Isma’il Abdul Bari, Yemen
7) Sheikh Isma’il Uthman Muhammad, Sudan
8) Dr. Amin Ali Muqbil, Yemen
9) Proselytiser Al-Amin Karkush, Algeria
10) Sheikh Bilal Baroudi, Lebanon
11) Proselytiser Tawarim Kishlakci, Turkey
12) Dr. Harith Sulaiman al-Dhari [Iraq]
13) Dr. Hakim al-Matiri, Kuwait
14) Proselytiser Hasan Salem Hasan, Qatar
15) Proselytiser Khalid al-Dhahir, Lebanon
16) Proselytiser Khalil Asi, Denmark
17) Proselytiser Daud Abdullah, Britain
18) Sheikh Raed al-Jabouri, Iraq
19) Sheikh Rachid al-Ghannouchi, Tunisia [resides in Britain]
20) Proselytiser Ribhi Subhi al-Atiwi, Jordan
21) Proselytiser Rabi Haddad, Lebanon
22) Dr. Sami Muhammad Saleh
23) Proselytiser Sami Najid Sa’id, Jordan
24) Dr. Shafi al-Hajiri, Qatar
25) Dr. Shaker Tawfiq al-Adouri, Jordan
26) Proselytiser Shah Jahan Abdul Qayyum, Britain
27) Dr. Shawkat Karashji, Kosovo
28) Sheikh Safwan Murshid, Yemen
29) Sheikh Salah Nasr al-Bahr, Yemen
30) Dr. Adel Hasan Yusuf al-Hamad, Bahrain
31) Sheikh Arif bin Ahmad al-Sabri, Yemen
32) Sheikh Abbas Ahmad al-Nahari
33) Sheikh Abdul Hai Yusuf, Sudan
34) Sheikh Abdul Rahman al-Khamisi, Yemen
35) Proselytiser Abdul Rahman Abdullah Jami’an, Kuwait
36) Dr. Abdul Salam Daud al-Kubaisi, Iraq
37) Dr. Abdul Samid al-Radhi, Morocco
38) Dr. Abdul Aziz Kamel, Egypt
39) Dr. Abdul Ali Masul, Morocco
40) Proselytiser Abdul Fattah Hamdash, Algeria
41) Dr. Abdul Karim al-Sheikh, Sudan
42) Sheikh Abdullah Ahmad al-Adini, Yemen
43) Sheikh Abdullah Hasan Khayrat, Yemen
44) Sheikh Abdullah Faysal al-Ahdal, Yemen
45) Sheikh Abdul Majid bin Muhammad al-Rimi, Yemen
46) Sheikh Abdul Malik al-Wazir, Yemen
47) Sheikh Abdil Wahid al-Khamisi, Yemen
48) Sheikh Abdul Wahhab al-Hamiqani, Yemen
49) Dr. Abdul Wahhab bin Lutf al-Dulaimi, Yemen
50) Proselytiser Izz al-Din Jarafa bin Muhammad, Algeria
51) Proselytiser Azzam al-Ayyubi, Lebanon
52) Dr. Ali Muhammad Maqboul al-Ahdal
53) Proselytiser Imad al-Din Bakri, Sudan
54) Proselytiser Imad Sa’ad, Iraq
55) Sheikh Omar Sulaiman al-Ashqar, Palestine
56) Proselytiser Faris Muhammad, Denmark
57) Sheikh Latif al-Sa’idi, Britain
58) Dr. Muhsin al-Awaji, Saudi Arabia
59) Proselytiser Muhammad al-Khalid, Denmark
60) Sheikh Muhammd al-Sadiq Mughlas, Yemen
61) Prof. Muhammad al-Ani, Britain
62) Proselytiser Muhammad al-Ghanim, Saudi Arabia
63) Proselytiser Muhammad al-Mufrih, Saudi Arabia
64) Sheikh Muhammad Ahmad al-Wazir, Yemen
65) Sheikh Muhammad bin Musa al-Amiri, Yemen
66) Sheikh Muhammad bin Nasr al-Hazmi, Yemen
67) Dr. Muhammad Juhaid Bu Aynain
68) Dr. Muhammad Ahmad Abdullah, Bahrain
69) Proselytiser Muhammad Khalid Muwasi, Palestine
70) Proselytiser Muhammad Salem al-Ali
71) Sheikh Muhammad Sa’ad al-Hatami, Yemen
72) Proselytiser Muhammad Sawalha, Palestine [resides in Britain]
73) Sheikh Muhammad Abdul Karim al-Da’is, Yemen
74) Sheikh Muhammad Abdul Karim Abu Faris
75) Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah al-Ghubaisi, Yemen
76) Sheikh Muhammad Ali al-Anasi, Yemen
77) Sheikh Muhammad Ali Mir’i, Yemen
78) Dr. Muhammad Magdi Krekar, Egypt
79) Sheikh Mudashir Ahmad Isma’il, Sudan
80) Sheikh Murad Ahmad al-Qudsi, Yemen
81) Dr. Mustafa al-Rif, Morocco
82) Proselytiser Nasser al-Fadhala, Bahrain
83) Dr. Nasser Jasim al-Sani, Kuwait
84) Proselytiser Nasif Nasser, Palestine
85) Proselytiser Nadhir Alan, Turkey
86) Sheikh Huza bin Sa’ad al-Asouri, Yemen
87) Dr. Hamam Sa’id, Jordan
88) Dr. Walid Musa’id al-Tabatibai, Kuwait
89) Proselytiser Yusuf al-Jababili, Tunisia
90) Proselytiser Yusuf Muhammad al-Barahimi
2. The Gaza flotilla initiative was a step in the implementation of the Jihadi "Istanbul declaration", which was issued at a conference held in Istanbul on 14-15 February 2009 under the title, "Gaza victory". Around 200 Arab and European Sunni sheikhs and clerics, as well as members of Hamas attended the conference – 90 of them signed the declaration (see appendix). According to a BBC reporter who attended the event, "speaker after speaker called for jihad against Israel in support of Hamas".[1] The Istanbul declaration set the ideological Jihadi confrontational violent formula for future materialization of its decisions, as demonstrated in the events of the flotilla to Gaza. The Gaza Flotilla initiative must be linked and understood within the radical pan-Islamic context and the mindset as reflected by its initiators in light of the Istanbul declaration and the 90 radical Muslim scholars and clerics from around the world who publicly sanctioned the legitimacy and support of Hamas and its military actions.
3. The Jihadi Istanbul Declaration affirmed "The obligation of the Islamic Nation to find a fair formula of reconciliation between the sons of the Palestinian people, under whose responsibility a legitimate authority will be formed that will attend to the fixed norms and the legitimate and national rights; and will carry on with the jihad and Resistance against the occupier until the liberation of all Palestine.” It also affirmed "The obligation of the Islamic Nation to open the crossings -- all crossings -- in and out of Palestine permanently, in order to allow access to all the needs of the Palestinians -- money, clothing, food, medicine, weapons and other essentials, so that they are able to live and perform the jihad in the way of Allah Almighty.” Additional affirmation has noted that: "We affirm that the victory that Allah accomplished by means of our brothers the Mujahidin, our defiant and steadfast kinsfolk in Gaza, was indeed achieved through His favor and help - exalted be He! It was also achieved through fulfilling the religious obligation of jihad in His way."
4. According to the Istanbul declaration, there is an obligation for "the Islamic Nation to regard the sending of foreign warships into Muslim waters, claiming to control the borders and prevent the smuggling of arms to Gaza, as a declaration of war, a new occupation, sinful aggression, and a clear violation of the sovereignty of the Nation". It continues: "This must be rejected and fought by all means and ways."[2]
The Istanbul Declaration signatories and their involvement in the flotilla
Several participants on board the violent ship Mavi Marmara were identified as participants and signatories of the Jihadi Istanbul declaration and their personal involvement in the flotilla demonstrates their commitment to the Jihadi cause by posing themselves as a leading model.
Muhammad Kazem Sawalha - one of the flotilla's organizers (Sawalha did not personally paticipate in the flotilla), and formerly a high-ranking fHamas commander of the Iz A-Din Al Qassam Brigades residing and active in the UK, appears in the signatory list at number 72.[3] It is worth mentioning a statement made by Muhammad Sawalha, the senior Hamas operative in Britain who was involved in launching the previous aid flotilla (“Lifeline 3”). According to Sawalha’s statement, the next aid convoy will avoid an “unwanted confrontation” with the Egyptian authorities, which happened last time. Next time, said Sawalha, “the confrontation will be directly with the Zionist enemy itself on the high seas” (Al-Intiqad, Hezbollah’s website, January 17, 2010).
Walid Al-Tabtabai - prominent flotilla activist from Kuwait who appears as a signatory on the Istanbul declaration (number 88) is known to support armed resistance in Palestine and in Iraq. At a press conference in Antalya, Turkey, the flotilla organizers asked all the participants to "write their wills." Following the press conference, Walid Al-Tabtabai reportedly "did not hesitate to write his will, in defiance of the Israeli threats".[4]
Sheikh Muhammad al-Hazimi, appears as a signatory on the Istanbul Declaration (number 66), a member of the Yemeni Parliament and of Al-Islah (the Yemini reform bloc), was photographed on the deck of the Mavi Marmara brandishing his large, curved dagger.
Other prominent radical Islamic participants in the flotilla
The Arab-Israeli Sheikh Ra'ed Salah, head of the northern branch of the Islamic Movement in Israel, is a radical Islamist whose participation in the flotilla on board the Mavi Marmara was no coincidence. He is one of the founders and a board member of the Union of Good and he maintains close ties with the Hamas leadership and supports its activities through material support and past funding to Hamas charitable organizations in the West Bank.[5]
The Yemeni Al Islah party sent three members to participate in the flotilla on board the violent ship. The Islah party runs the radical Islamic Al Islah charitable organization is also part of the Union of Good and known to be committed to the Jihad struggle of Hamas and is designated by Israel and the USA. It should be noted that the Yemeni Al Islah organization is lead by sheikh Abd Al Majid Zindani, a radical Islamist linked to Al Qaeda and Bin Laden, designated by the USA in 1995 as a terrorist, accused in 2004 of supplying weapons to al Qaeda and is known to be linked and involved in the preparations of Omar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the Christmas 2009 Detroit failed airline bombing attempt.
Possible involvement of the Union of Good
In a retrospective analysis, which is based on open-source material, some of which had been published prior to the flotilla’s violent events, one can conclude with a high degree of certainty that the Union of Good, as a radical Islamic umbrella worldwide coalition of Islamic charities, was assigned to carry out and implement the Istanbul declaration's action items to break the Israeli siege on Gaza. The Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader Sheikh Yusuf al-Qardawi who sanctioned in 2002 the legitimacy of suicide bombings against Israeli civilians, as well as numerous notorious and hateful Fatwas against Israel and the Jews, runs this collection of charities. The Union of Good was outlawed by Israel and is a designated entity by the U.S. Treasury Department due to its fund-raising activities on behalf of Hamas and the Hamas-controlled front charitable organizations in the West Bank and Gaza. The Union of Good has an international web of connections in the Arab and the Islamic world, as well as in Muslim communities in the West, which enables it to set the logistic infrastructure, funds and recruits in a relatively short period of time.
The Turkish IHH which, is part of the Union of Good, was set as the leading, prominent organization among the coalition organizations participating in the aid flotilla scheduled to arrive in the Gaza Strip. The Turkish IHH (Insani Yardim Vakfi, IHH, “humanitarian relief fund”) is known to be a radical Islamic organization, which was established in 1992 and formally registered in Istanbul in 1995. The IHH (outlawed by Israel in 2008) is part of the Union of Good, and seems to have been chosen to lead the Jihadi violent flotilla to Gaza. The Arab-Israeli Sheikh Ra'ed Salah’s participation in the flotilla on board the Mavi Marmara was no coincidence. He is one of the founders and a board member of the Union of Good and he maintains close ties with the Hamas leadership and supports its activities through material support and past funding to Hamas charitable organizations in the West Bank.
The Yemeni Al Islah party, which sent three members to participate in the flotilla on board the violent ship, runs the radical Islamic Al Islah charitable organization, which is also a member organization within the Union of Good and known to be committed to the Jihad struggle of Hamas and designated by Israel and the USA. Organizing the flotilla to Gaza necessitated a long series of preparations and a vast mobilization system which maintained contact with hundreds of organizations and operatives around the globe, most of them affiliated with radical Islam and the Muslim Brotherhood, and some of them pro-Palestinian from Western relief organizations. One can not rule out the possibility of the Union of Good, as a pan-Islamic organization with some of its associated members having participated in the Istanbul conference and the Union of Good as a pan-Islamic pro-Hamas umbrella organization, were commissioned and designated to serve as a platform had presumably supported the logistic preparations and mobilized recruits.
Appendix Text of the Istanbul Declaration and signatories:
http://www.standcampaign.org/wiki/index.php?title=Istanbul_Declaration
In the name of Allah the Most-merciful the All-merciful the statement by the religious scholars and proselytisers (du’a) of the Islamic Nation (ummah) to all rulers and peoples concerning events in Gaza Praise to Allah who strengthened His troops, aided His servants and alone routed the Zionist Jews, who says, ‘It was incumbent on Us to aid the believers.’ [Quran 30:47] And blessing and peace be on the Imam of the mujahidin who says, ‘There will remain a group of my Ummah adhering to the truth, and those who oppose them will not harm them until Allah’s command comes.’ [Hadith]
(And now to our topic).
This statement is addressed to the Islamic Nation, its religious scholars, its rulers and its peoples. In it we congratulate the whole family of Islam on the manifest victory which Allah has granted us in the land of Gaza, a land of pride and dignity, over the Zionist Jewish occupiers. Allah has appointed it as the first step in the complete victory for all of Palestine and the holy places of the Muslims. Furthermore, we herein emphatically affirm various resolutions and judgments.
I. Affirmation of the following unequivocal resolutions:
1. We affirm that the victory that Allah accomplished by means of our brothers the mujahidin, our defiant and steadfast kinsfolk in Gaza, was indeed achieved through His favor and help - exalted be He! It was also achieved through fulfilling the religious obligation of jihad in His way. This is a confirmation of His statement - sublime is He! - ‘How often a small party overcame a large party, by Allah’s leave.’ [Quran, 2:249]
2. We affirm that this manifest victory has clearly disclosed the volume of international and local military and political conspiracy against the jihad and the mujahidin in Gaza, as represented by the following: • Military co-operation in tightening the blockade and closing the crossings to the people of Gaza, especially the Rafah crossing. • Public or quasi-public support for the enemy. • The prevention of demonstrations and popular events held in support of the mujahidin; the arrest, trial and severe punishments of those who instigate them. • The aggressive pressure put on the mujahidin to break their will and force them to agree to their [the conspirators] terms and the stipulations of the Zionist enemy. • The attempt to present the Hamas government as the cause of this malicious Jewish Zionist war over Gaza. • The absence of any official and effective Arab and Islamic stance and its weakness in reflecting the will of the Arab and Islamic peoples to help our brothers in Gaza win. This indicates the width of the gap between the Nation and those rulers who lead it. • The use of funds for reconstruction and aid to those hurt as a negative pressure card on the mujahidin to abandon their legitimate demands, or some of them. • The prevention of delivery of aid and reconstruction funds to the Hamas government and the reliable authorities in Gaza; deeming the Palestinian Authority, represented by the presidency of Abbas and the Fayyad government, the sole representative of the Palestinian people, without the Hamas government; and the delivery of such funds and aid to increase their grip on the legitimate elected government of Hamas. This redoubles the suffering of the people of Gaza at the time they mostly need those funds and aid.
3. We affirm in full conviction that the Palestinian Authority, whose mandate is coming to an end, is not eligible to represent the Palestinian people. It stands outside the will of its people, and has given up the choice of jihad in the way of Allah Almighty as an effective means in defeating the occupation and the liberation of the Islamic holy places. It adopts the wishes of the Nation’s enemies in exchange for the illusions of false peace. 4. We affirm in full conviction that the so-called Arab peace initiative is a proven betrayal of the Islamic Nation and the Palestinian cause, and a blatant betrayal of the Palestinian people. It aims to criminalise the Resistance [muqawama] against the Zionist occupying entity in perpetuity through its de facto recognition of it, as well as the confiscation of the right of refugees to return to their homes and their property.
II. Affirmation of the following legal judgments:
1. The obligation of the Islamic Nation to rush to the aid of the people in Gaza; to rebuild what the Zionist aggression destroyed; to compensate the injured and support the widows, orphans, those suffering permanent disabilities, and the old and infirm.
2. The obligation of the Islamic Nation to restrict itself to dealing only with the legitimate elected Palestinian government (Hamas) in the delivery of aid and reconstruction of dwellings. It is the sole government authorised to do that by reason of its official legitimacy as well as its maintaining the Resistance against the Jewish Zionist occupation, its integrity, and its solidarity with the people in all circumstances.
3. The obligation of the Islamic Nation not to recognise the Palestinian Authority, whose mandate is ending, as representative of the Palestinian people. It must not elect it again, in view of its proven financial and administrative corruption as well as its squandering of time and assets behind the false peace process. It is also necessary to work seriously to choose a new authority that will guard the Palestinian ranks, respect their will and their right to resist the occupation, and work for the complete liberation of its land and holy places.
4. The obligation of the Islamic Nation to circulate a declaration to withhold aid funds from the undeserving or placing them in the hands of those who are not trustworthy. It must regard this as a legal betrayal that should be prosecuted, and punish those who cause mayhem, negligence and waste of these moneys.
5. The obligation of the Islamic Nation to find a fair formula of reconciliation between the sons of the Palestinian people, under whose responsibility a legitimate authority will be formed that will attend to the fixed norms and the legitimate and national rights; and will carry on with the jihad and Resistance against the occupier until the liberation of all Palestine.
6. The obligation of the Islamic Nation to open the crossings -- all crossings -- in and out of Palestine permanently, in order to allow access to all the needs of the Palestinians -- money, clothing, food, medicine, weapons and other essentials, so that they are able to live and perform the jihad in the way of Allah Almighty. The closure of the crossings or the prevention of the entry of weapons through them should be regarded as high treason in the Islamic Nation, and clear support for the Zionist enemy.
7. The obligation of the Islamic Nation to regard everyone standing with the Zionist entity, whether countries, institutions or individuals, as providing a substantial contribution to the crimes and brutality of this entity; the position towards him is the same as towards this usurping entity.
8. The obligation of the Islamic Nation to regard the sending of foreign warships into Muslim waters, claiming to control the borders and prevent the smuggling of arms to Gaza, as a declaration of war, a new occupation, sinful aggression, and a clear violation of the sovereignty of the Nation. This must be rejected and fought by all means and ways. To conclude: the Nation’s scholars and proselytisers remind the Islamic Nation, rulers and ruled alike, of the necessity of returning to its religion, adhering to the book of its Lord and the sunna of his Prophet, working for its unity, and seizing control of the instruments of power that will make possible its supremacy and the preservation of its holy places and provisions ‘Allah prevails in his purpose, but most people know not.’ [Quran, 12: 21]).
The Signatories as presented in the Declaration:
1) Sheikh Ahmad Sulaiman Ahif, Yemen
2) Dr. Ahmad al-Ghamidi, Saudi Arabia
3) Dr. Ahmad al-Misbahi, Yemen
4) Sheihk Ahmad abdul Razzaq al-Raqihi, Yemen
5) Proselytiser [da’iya] Ahmad Muhammad Abdullah, Egypt
6) Sheikh Isma’il Abdul Bari, Yemen
7) Sheikh Isma’il Uthman Muhammad, Sudan
8) Dr. Amin Ali Muqbil, Yemen
9) Proselytiser Al-Amin Karkush, Algeria
10) Sheikh Bilal Baroudi, Lebanon
11) Proselytiser Tawarim Kishlakci, Turkey
12) Dr. Harith Sulaiman al-Dhari [Iraq]
13) Dr. Hakim al-Matiri, Kuwait
14) Proselytiser Hasan Salem Hasan, Qatar
15) Proselytiser Khalid al-Dhahir, Lebanon
16) Proselytiser Khalil Asi, Denmark
17) Proselytiser Daud Abdullah, Britain
18) Sheikh Raed al-Jabouri, Iraq
19) Sheikh Rachid al-Ghannouchi, Tunisia [resides in Britain]
20) Proselytiser Ribhi Subhi al-Atiwi, Jordan
21) Proselytiser Rabi Haddad, Lebanon
22) Dr. Sami Muhammad Saleh
23) Proselytiser Sami Najid Sa’id, Jordan
24) Dr. Shafi al-Hajiri, Qatar
25) Dr. Shaker Tawfiq al-Adouri, Jordan
26) Proselytiser Shah Jahan Abdul Qayyum, Britain
27) Dr. Shawkat Karashji, Kosovo
28) Sheikh Safwan Murshid, Yemen
29) Sheikh Salah Nasr al-Bahr, Yemen
30) Dr. Adel Hasan Yusuf al-Hamad, Bahrain
31) Sheikh Arif bin Ahmad al-Sabri, Yemen
32) Sheikh Abbas Ahmad al-Nahari
33) Sheikh Abdul Hai Yusuf, Sudan
34) Sheikh Abdul Rahman al-Khamisi, Yemen
35) Proselytiser Abdul Rahman Abdullah Jami’an, Kuwait
36) Dr. Abdul Salam Daud al-Kubaisi, Iraq
37) Dr. Abdul Samid al-Radhi, Morocco
38) Dr. Abdul Aziz Kamel, Egypt
39) Dr. Abdul Ali Masul, Morocco
40) Proselytiser Abdul Fattah Hamdash, Algeria
41) Dr. Abdul Karim al-Sheikh, Sudan
42) Sheikh Abdullah Ahmad al-Adini, Yemen
43) Sheikh Abdullah Hasan Khayrat, Yemen
44) Sheikh Abdullah Faysal al-Ahdal, Yemen
45) Sheikh Abdul Majid bin Muhammad al-Rimi, Yemen
46) Sheikh Abdul Malik al-Wazir, Yemen
47) Sheikh Abdil Wahid al-Khamisi, Yemen
48) Sheikh Abdul Wahhab al-Hamiqani, Yemen
49) Dr. Abdul Wahhab bin Lutf al-Dulaimi, Yemen
50) Proselytiser Izz al-Din Jarafa bin Muhammad, Algeria
51) Proselytiser Azzam al-Ayyubi, Lebanon
52) Dr. Ali Muhammad Maqboul al-Ahdal
53) Proselytiser Imad al-Din Bakri, Sudan
54) Proselytiser Imad Sa’ad, Iraq
55) Sheikh Omar Sulaiman al-Ashqar, Palestine
56) Proselytiser Faris Muhammad, Denmark
57) Sheikh Latif al-Sa’idi, Britain
58) Dr. Muhsin al-Awaji, Saudi Arabia
59) Proselytiser Muhammad al-Khalid, Denmark
60) Sheikh Muhammd al-Sadiq Mughlas, Yemen
61) Prof. Muhammad al-Ani, Britain
62) Proselytiser Muhammad al-Ghanim, Saudi Arabia
63) Proselytiser Muhammad al-Mufrih, Saudi Arabia
64) Sheikh Muhammad Ahmad al-Wazir, Yemen
65) Sheikh Muhammad bin Musa al-Amiri, Yemen
66) Sheikh Muhammad bin Nasr al-Hazmi, Yemen
67) Dr. Muhammad Juhaid Bu Aynain
68) Dr. Muhammad Ahmad Abdullah, Bahrain
69) Proselytiser Muhammad Khalid Muwasi, Palestine
70) Proselytiser Muhammad Salem al-Ali
71) Sheikh Muhammad Sa’ad al-Hatami, Yemen
72) Proselytiser Muhammad Sawalha, Palestine [resides in Britain]
73) Sheikh Muhammad Abdul Karim al-Da’is, Yemen
74) Sheikh Muhammad Abdul Karim Abu Faris
75) Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah al-Ghubaisi, Yemen
76) Sheikh Muhammad Ali al-Anasi, Yemen
77) Sheikh Muhammad Ali Mir’i, Yemen
78) Dr. Muhammad Magdi Krekar, Egypt
79) Sheikh Mudashir Ahmad Isma’il, Sudan
80) Sheikh Murad Ahmad al-Qudsi, Yemen
81) Dr. Mustafa al-Rif, Morocco
82) Proselytiser Nasser al-Fadhala, Bahrain
83) Dr. Nasser Jasim al-Sani, Kuwait
84) Proselytiser Nasif Nasser, Palestine
85) Proselytiser Nadhir Alan, Turkey
86) Sheikh Huza bin Sa’ad al-Asouri, Yemen
87) Dr. Hamam Sa’id, Jordan
88) Dr. Walid Musa’id al-Tabatibai, Kuwait
89) Proselytiser Yusuf al-Jababili, Tunisia
90) Proselytiser Yusuf Muhammad al-Barahimi
Al Qaeda in the Maghreb and the terror abductions
The al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), previously known as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) is an Algeria-based Sunni Muslim jihadist group that originally formed in 1998 by Hassan Hattab, a former Armed Islamic Group (GIA) regional commander who broke with the GIA in protest over the GIA's slaughter of civilians.[1] In September 2003, it was reported that Hattab had been deposed as the emir of the GSPC and replaced by Nabil Sahraoui (Sheikh Abou Ibrahim Mustapha), a 39 year-old former GIA commander.[2] Following the death of Sahraoui in June 2004, Abdelmalek Droukdal, also known as Abu Musab Abdul Wadoud, University-educated as a science student and well known for his bomb-making abilities became the leader of the GSPC.[3] The GSPC had close to 30,000 members at its height, but the Algerian Government’s counterterrorism efforts have reduced the group’s ranks to several thousands.
The GSPC declared its allegiance to al-Qaeda as early as 2003, but Ben Laden's deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, officially approved GSPC's merger in a videotape released on September 11, 2006.[4] AQIM has since claimed responsibility for attacks under its new name. Originally, its aims included the overthrow of Algeria's secular military government and the establishment of an Islamic caliphate. The AQIM has become a regional terrorist organization, recruiting and operating all throughout the Maghreb—and beyond to Europe itself.
AQIM's vocal support of al-Qaeda and declaration of solidarity with Islamic extremists in the Palestinian territories, Iraq, Somalia, and Chechnya indicate it's broader intent. "Our general goals are the same goals of Al Qaeda the mother," AQIM's current leader, Abdelmalek Droukdal. [5]
Jihadist groups in North Africa and the Sahel states are increasingly turning to hostage-taking to fill their war chests with ransoms and for political gain. The Saudi daily Asharq al-Awsat published a letter from AQIM entitled, "Call for help from the Islamic Maghreb." In this letter, AQIM acknowledged that it is suffering from a lack of operatives and most importantly that its elements have "an urgent need of cash."[6]
In economic terms, kidnapping has proved profitable for AQIM. In this regard, it should be noted that abductions have long been a favored tactic of AQIM (and GSPC before it). Most victims in the past have tended to be wealthy Algerians kidnapped for money. AQIM has made no secret that targeting foreign nationals has become one of their priorities. In Algeria, AQIM targeted U.S. and Russian contractors, and the U.N. compound in Algiers, while Western nations have warned their citizens of the risks associated with remaining in the country. AQIM also almost succeeded in kidnapping two French executives. After this incident, a number of French nationals (mostly women and children) left Algeria to return to safer grounds. The idea behind this strategy is to kill the tourism industry and dry out foreign investment in the region.[7]
The abductions since 2008, illustrate the increase in anti-Western activity by AQIM. Algeria and Mauritania in particular have experienced a rise in attacks on foreign interests and nationals. The latest abduction cases in 2009 indicate that this now also applies to other countries in the region. GSPC \ AQIM kidnappings 2000 – 2008 AQIM has a tradition of self-financing its operations mostly through kidnappings, racketeering and smuggling of all kinds.
In February 2003, the Algerian GSPC under the command of Amari Saifi, also known as Abderrazak el-Para, kidnapped 32 European tourists (including Austrian, Swiss and German nationals) in the Algerian Sahara. Seventeen of them were freed thanks to a military operation led by Algerian forces, and the remaining 14 – one hostage had died – were released six months later after a large ransom reportedly ($10 million) was allegedly paid by German authorities. This money was used to buy substantial quantities of sophisticated weapons including surface-to-air missiles, heavy machine guns, mortars, and satellite-positioning equipment. The Algerian security services seized a part of this arms in January 2004. ". Abderrazak el-Para was captured in Chad in 2004 and extradited to Algeria and Algerian courts sentenced him to death.[8]
In 2007, a group of French picnickers was killed. The gunmen were believed to be linked to al Qaeda's North Africa branch and the incident prompted organizers of the famous Dakar Rally to cancel the trans-Sahara car race.[9]
On February 22, 2008 , AQIM – kidnapped two Austrian citizens in Tunisia. The hostages were reportedly taken to Mali. and held there until released for a ransom. The AQIM first demanded the release of Abderrazak el-Para and other members imprisoned in Algeria. They then changed the request to include two Muslims imprisoned on terrorism charges in Austria. The hostages were finally released in October 2008, for ransom of $4 million paid by Vienna and the release of several jihadists held in Mauritania, including a veteran fighter named Oussama el-Merdaci.[10]
On December 14, 2008, two Canadian diplomats, UN special envoy to Niger, Robert Fowler, and his aide, Louis Guay, mysteriously disappeared while on a field trip. The fate of the two Canadians long remained shrouded in uncertainty. A Nigerian Tuareg rebel group first claimed responsibility for their abduction, but this claim was quickly retracted. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb released an online statement in which it claimed responsibility for the abduction of Fowler and Guay and other Europeans. [11]
On April 29, 2009 , Robert Fowler , Louis Guay, and a Swiss and German were released by AQIM in exchange of four jailed mujahedeen. All four had been jailed in Mali since February 2008. One of the released terrorist is an Algerian al-Qaeda member, Oussama Alboumerdassi, fought with the then U.S.-backed mujahedeen resistance to the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, staying on until 1992. Two of the other three terror suspects were Mauritanian, while the remaining one was either Jordanian or Syrian.[12]
At the heart of the negotiations seeking the release of the hostages were Saif al-Islam Muammar al-Gaddafi, son of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, and a relative of Burkina Faso President Blaise Compaore, identified as Mauritanian businessman Abdallah Chaffei.d. Saif al-Islam, who heads the Gaddafi Foundation charity, mediated in 2008 the case of two Austrians held by AQIM in Mali.[13]
Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper specifically thanked both Mali and Burkina Faso during a press conference in which he announced the Canadians' release. AQIM declared in an unofficial manner that " four of its members . . . have been delivered to the north of Mali as a result of a major transaction led by the Malian president," it said.[14]
The kidnappings of 2009
On January 4, 2009,a local criminal gang tried to kidnap a group of four Saudi tourists hunting birds in the desert region of Tillaberi in western Niger. The attack triggered a gun battle in which one Saudi Arabian was murdered and two other Saudis were wounded. The A-Sharq al-Awsat Arabic-language newspaper reported that the brigands wanted to sell them to Mokhtar Belmokhtar, an elusive al-Qaeda leader who operates in the region. Belmokhtar is associated with the Algeria-based al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.[15]
On April 22, 2009 , four Europeans (two Swiss, one German and a Briton), were kidnapped. The four Europeans were returning from the Anderamboukane festival on nomad culture in the border area between Mali and Niger when they were kidnapped. Their three-car convoy was ambushed; the first car got away and alerted the security forces, but the second and third cars, which were carrying the tourists, stayed on the spot and the people in them were kidnapped by Tuareg rebels who sold later their captives to the jihadists. The group has demanded the release of Jordanian militant leader Abu Qatada, held in Britain since 2005, and threatened to kill the Briton hostage Edwin Dyer if the demand went unmet. The Algerian media has reported that the jihadists had demanded $14 million for the hostages and also demanded the release of 20 of its men held in Mali.[16]
The Swiss and German women were freed in April 2009 , along with the two Canadian diplomats working for the United Nations, abducted in Niger on Dec. 14, 2008. The Swiss man was released in July 2009. The Briton Edwin Dyer was murdered by his kidnappers and was the first British kidnap victim executed by al-Qaeda outside Iraq. Gordon Brown, Britain's prime minister, condemned the killing as an "appalling and barbaric act of terrorism" and said it reinforced Britain's commitment to confront terrorism. "I want those who would use terror against British citizens to know beyond doubt that we and our allies will pursue them relentlessly, and that they will meet the justice they deserve."[17]
On June 25, 2009, AQIM took responsibility for the killing of an American aid worker in Mauritania's capital city of Nouakchott. The attack has been described as a botched kidnapping attempt.
Al-Jazeera TV said it had received an audio statement from al Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb in which the group said 39-year-old Christopher Ervin Leggett, an American aid worker, was killed for allegedly trying to convert Muslims to Christianity.
"Two knights of the Islamic Maghreb succeeded Tuesday morning at 8 a.m. to kill the infidel American Christopher Leggett for his Christianizing activities," the group said.
Mauritania's Interior Ministry said Thursday it was investigating the death and security forces were doing "all they can to catch the criminals."[18]
On November 25, 2009 the Frenchman Pierre Camatte was snatched from a hotel in Menaka in the Sahel region of northern Mali, more than 1,500 kilometers from the capital Bamako. In a message delivered in early January 2009, AQIM threatened to kill the French hostage if France and Mali did not meet the group’s demand for the release of four militants imprisoned by Mali’s authorities. The message included a call to the French public and the Camatte family to pressure French President Nicolas Sarkozy to accept their demands if they wanted the Frenchman to avoid the fate of English hostage Edwin Dyer.[19] On February 23, 2010, AQIM released Pierre Camatte. Camatte's release follows that of four Islamist prisoners by Mali.
Algeria and Mauritania, recalled their ambassadors to protest against the prisoner swap. Algerian media said two of the freed men were Algerian, and the Mauritanian government said one was Mauritanian. [20]
French President Nicolas Sarkozy, said in a statement that he was delighted that Camatte had been freed. He said he had thanked Malian President Amadou Toumani Toure for his handling of the crisis and pledged French support in the struggle against terrorism.[21]
On November 29,2009, three Spanish volunteers, two men and a women, (identified as Albert Vilalta, 35, Alicia Gamez, 35, and Roque Pascual, 50) were traveling in Mauritania in a convoy delivering humanitarian aid for the Spanish group Barcelona Accio Solidaria, when they were kidnapped .
AQIM claimed the kidnappings of a Frenchman and three Spaniards, seized in Mali and Mauritania, in an audio tape released on December 16, 2009 by Al-Jazeera television. In the audio tape Al Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb ( AQIM) spokesman, Saleh Abu Mohammad said:
"Two units of the valiant mujahedeen managed to kidnap four Europeans in two distinct operations,
The first in Mali where Frenchman Pierre Camatte was seized on November 25, and the second in Mauritania where three Spaniards were held on November 29. France and Spain will be informed later of the legitimate demands of the mujahedeen." [22]
On March 12, 2010, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb said in a statement posted on militant websites, that it released a Spanish woman it had held captive for 100 days in Mauritania because she voluntarily converted to Islam. AQIM said it also took into account health reasons in choosing to free Alicia Gamez. "The Spanish woman converted to Islam voluntarily after the mujahidin (fighters) exposed her to Islam and its teachings. She took the name of Aicha," the brief message said. The two male Spanish volunteers still being held captive by AQIM.[23]
On December 18, 2009, an Italian couple was kidnapped in southeastern Mauritania. 65-year-old Nicola Sergio Cicala and his wife, 39-year-old Philomen Kabouree (originally from Burkina Faso). They were kidnapped along the road from Aioun in Mauritania to Kayes in Mali. AQIM claimed responsibility for this kidnapping in two separate messages. The first message appeared on al-Arabiya TV, where a picture of the couple was shown with an audio message. The second message was posted on the Internet, where it clearly stated the kidnapping was linked to the role that Italy had in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and because of its support to the “crusade against Islam” (ANSA, December 31, 2009).[24]
AQIM had demanded in February that Mali's government free imprisoned militants before 1 March in exchange for the couple. Shortly before the deadline expired, Mr Cicala urged Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi to intervene in a purported audio message posted on the internet.
In April 2010 , the AQIM freed the couple and Local officials in Mali said Sergio Cicala and Philomene Kaboure were picked up by an army patrol in the eastern Gao region. Italy's foreign minister said they were "in the hands of Malian authorities" and were being taken to a "safe place". In Rome, Italian Foreign Minister Franco Frattini said the Italians' release had been the "fruit of intense diplomatic work that led authorities in Mali to take decisive actions to reach this solution". [25]
Criminal and terrorist cooperation in the abductions
The weakness of Sahelian states and the ineffective control of their territory have played a major role in the development of the current situation. Kidnappings have taken place in Tunisia, Mali, Niger and Mauritania, usually through local criminal gangs; hostages have then been moved to northern Mali, where a complex political and security scenario pitting local Tuareg tribes against the central government has allowed various terrorist groups to establish their own bases and training grounds .There are loose agreements between AQIM and a multiplicity of groups operating in the Sahel area :[26]
* The most famous of these is the "Moulathamoun group", headed by Belmokhtar (El Watan, August 1, 2007). Belmokhtar has had several disagreements with AQIM leader Abdelmalek Droukdel and acts in a semi-independent fashion. This uneasy collaboration was behind the kidnapping of the three Spanish aid workers who remained in the hands of al-Moulathamoun (AFP, 11 January 2010).
* The other main group in the area is the " Tareq ibn Ziyad", led by Yahia Abu Amar Abid Hammadou (a.k.a. Abdelhamid Abu Zeid), who created the group in AQIM’s 5th zone of operations (northeastern Algeria) in 2003 and subsequently moved to the Sahel area. Abu Zeid, who is allegedly responsible for the execution of British hostage Edwin Dyer, is also the leader of the Talaia al-Salafiya, Nasr Aflou and Muhajiroun groups.
The "Tareq Ibn Ziyad" branch currently holds kidnapped French national Pierre Camatte. In addition, the Italian couple is in the hands of Abu Yaya Amane, a lieutenant of Yahia Abu Amar who is probably trying to exploit this abduction to mark his own territory in the Sahel region and gain operational independence from the other two groups in the area .
Summary
Statistics kept by regional security services for 2007 show that 115 people, mostly businessmen, were abducted by Islamist groups with billions of dinars paid in ransoms.[27] It seems that AQIM is following Al-Qaeda in Iraq's modus operandi, after having imported suicide bombings to Algeria (mostly since the April 11, 2007 attacks), then recruiting teenagers, now AQIM is kidnapping foreign nationals.[28]
AQIM has claimed responsibility for most of the kidnappings across the region over the past few years. In most cases, the jihadists make political demands as well as ransoms that run into millions of dollars. The abductions since 2008 illustrate AQIM’s extended geographical reach (Tunisian, Algeria, Mali Niger). Whether the AQIM presence is direct or indirect, it has significant operational implications.
The number of kidnappings has risen since December 2008 and there are several reasons for this:
* AQIM has intensified its presence in Mauritania, Algeria, Mali,Niger and in the whole Sahel region.
* The weakness of these states and their ineffective control of the area. The security services in Mauritania, Mali and Niger do not have the equipment and the ability to fight in efficient way AQIM and other insurgents and the liberation of hostages by military means is really difficult.
* Most ransoms are paid, although governments rarely admit this is so.
AQIM's growing presence in the Sahel region and the increasing number of abductions of European tourists in Mauritania, Niger, Tunisia and Mali show that a profitable kidnapping industry has led to an increase in terrorism activity in this region. AQIM's activities were previously based along Algeria's Mediterranean coast, but security crackdowns by the Algerian military have forced the group into the largely ungoverned Sahara desert area of Mali, and along Algeria's northern border. Owing to the weakness of these states and their ineffective control of the area, AQIM militants are free to move across borders and to establish their bases in the region. This situation enables AQIM to combine its ideological goals with a series of tactical advantages. AQIM relies on local communities of the Sahara for sanctuary. This lucrative business profits local criminal gangs, which have become almost natural allies of AQIM in the region. [29]
AQIM's flexible structure in the region has led to a win-win situation where a profitable kidnapping network benefits local criminal groups, local AQIM-affiliated groups and the AQIM leadership. In this context, local criminals carry out the abductions and then sell the hostages to AQIM-affiliated groups for a profit; however, the terrorist groups then earn the highest profit, as they bear the highest risk and can extort a ransom from European governments fearful that the failure of negotiations could lead to the death of hostages, as in the Edwin Dyer case (Liberation [Paris], December 9, 2009).[30]
AQIM attacks on foreigners can be expected to grow as western companies increase investment in oil and gas exploration in the region. As long as the European states continue paying the ransom money, AQIM and it's allies in the Sahel will continue with the campaign of kidnappings. Last September, ( 2009), Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika pleaded before the United Nations General Assembly for a ban on paying ransoms to kidnappers, which he said had reached" worrying proportions."[31] Only an international comprehensive campaign that include:
Military operations against the AQIM infrastructure in the region.
Economic and military support to the local " weak" states ( Mauritania, Niger, Mali).
Decision not to surrender to the demands of the terrorist as a strategy.
Can lead in the long term to the reduction of kidnappings in the Sahel region and the defeat of the AQIM.
In April 2010 Four Sahara desert nations: Algeria, Mali, Mauritania and Niger are opening a joint military headquarters to coordinate their efforts against AQIM.
The new joint headquarters will be based in Tamanrasset, in southern Algeria.
The countries will strengthen intelligence cooperation, and plan to move toward joint military operations against terrorism, kidnappings, and the trafficking of drugs and weapons.[32]
Notes:
[1]Al Qaeda Organization in the Maghreb,Wikipedia.
Algerian group backs al-Qaeda2 BBC News, 23 October 2003
[3]Al Qaeda Organization in the Maghreb,Wikipedia.
[4]Al-Qaida joins Algerians against France", AP, 14 September 2006
[5]Interview of Abu Musab Abdul Wadoud with New York Times, July 2008.
[6] "Call for help from the Islamic Maghreb", published in Alsharq Alawsat.
[7] Olivier Guitta, AQIM new kidnappings strategy, Middle East Times, March 23, 2008.
[8] Staff writers ,Jihadist kidnappers plague North Africa, Algeria, UPI ,January 4, 2009.
[9] Al Qaeda claims slaying of U.S aid worker, CBSNEWS ,June 25, 2009.
[10] Ibid
[11] Hana Rogan, New AQIM abduction cases, Jihadica, February 24 ,2009.
[12] Niger kidnapping: mujahedeen fighters released in exchange for diplomats, Niger Watch, April 29,2009.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Staff writers ,Jihadist kidnappers plague North Africa, Algeria, UPI ,January 4, 2009.
[16] Hana Rogan, New AQIM abduction cases, Jihadica, February 24 ,2009.
[17]Staff writers ,Jihadist kidnappers plague North Africa, Algeria, UPI ,January 4, 2009
[18] Al Jazeera: Al Qaeda claims to have killed American aid worker in Mauritania, June 25, 2009.
[19] Radio France Internationale [RFI], January 11, 2010.
[20] Al Qaeda released Frenchman in prisoners swap, Alertnet, February 23, 2010.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Mark Tran, Three Spanish aid workers kidnapped in Mauritania, guardian.co.uk, November 30,2009.
[23]:"Spanish hostage converted to Islam'", Cairo (AP),March 12, 2010.
[24] Dario Cristiani, Riccardo Fabiani, AQIM funds terrorist operations with thriving Sahel- based kidnapping industry, Terrorism Monitor, volume 8 issue 4 , January 28, 2009.
[25] Al qaeda frees two Italian hostages in Mali: AFP,April 16,2010.
[26] Dario Cristiani, Riccardo Fabiani, AQIM funds terrorist operations with thriving Sahel- based kidnapping industry, Terrorism Monitor, volume 8 issue 4 , January 28, 2009.
[27] Staff writers ,Jihadist kidnappers plague North Africa, Algeria, UPI ,January 4, 2009.
[28] Olivier Guitta, AQIM new kidnappings strategy, Middle East Times, March 23, 2008.
[29] Dario Cristiani, Riccardo Fabiani, AQIM funds terrorist operations with thriving Sahel- based kidnapping industry, Terrorism Monitor, volume 8 issue 4 , January 28, 2009.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Kidnapping is lucrative for Al Qaeda in North Africa, AFP ,Dakar ,December 1, 2009.
[32] Four Saharan nations established joint anti terror command, VOA News.com, April 21, 2010.
The GSPC declared its allegiance to al-Qaeda as early as 2003, but Ben Laden's deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, officially approved GSPC's merger in a videotape released on September 11, 2006.[4] AQIM has since claimed responsibility for attacks under its new name. Originally, its aims included the overthrow of Algeria's secular military government and the establishment of an Islamic caliphate. The AQIM has become a regional terrorist organization, recruiting and operating all throughout the Maghreb—and beyond to Europe itself.
AQIM's vocal support of al-Qaeda and declaration of solidarity with Islamic extremists in the Palestinian territories, Iraq, Somalia, and Chechnya indicate it's broader intent. "Our general goals are the same goals of Al Qaeda the mother," AQIM's current leader, Abdelmalek Droukdal. [5]
Jihadist groups in North Africa and the Sahel states are increasingly turning to hostage-taking to fill their war chests with ransoms and for political gain. The Saudi daily Asharq al-Awsat published a letter from AQIM entitled, "Call for help from the Islamic Maghreb." In this letter, AQIM acknowledged that it is suffering from a lack of operatives and most importantly that its elements have "an urgent need of cash."[6]
In economic terms, kidnapping has proved profitable for AQIM. In this regard, it should be noted that abductions have long been a favored tactic of AQIM (and GSPC before it). Most victims in the past have tended to be wealthy Algerians kidnapped for money. AQIM has made no secret that targeting foreign nationals has become one of their priorities. In Algeria, AQIM targeted U.S. and Russian contractors, and the U.N. compound in Algiers, while Western nations have warned their citizens of the risks associated with remaining in the country. AQIM also almost succeeded in kidnapping two French executives. After this incident, a number of French nationals (mostly women and children) left Algeria to return to safer grounds. The idea behind this strategy is to kill the tourism industry and dry out foreign investment in the region.[7]
The abductions since 2008, illustrate the increase in anti-Western activity by AQIM. Algeria and Mauritania in particular have experienced a rise in attacks on foreign interests and nationals. The latest abduction cases in 2009 indicate that this now also applies to other countries in the region. GSPC \ AQIM kidnappings 2000 – 2008 AQIM has a tradition of self-financing its operations mostly through kidnappings, racketeering and smuggling of all kinds.
In February 2003, the Algerian GSPC under the command of Amari Saifi, also known as Abderrazak el-Para, kidnapped 32 European tourists (including Austrian, Swiss and German nationals) in the Algerian Sahara. Seventeen of them were freed thanks to a military operation led by Algerian forces, and the remaining 14 – one hostage had died – were released six months later after a large ransom reportedly ($10 million) was allegedly paid by German authorities. This money was used to buy substantial quantities of sophisticated weapons including surface-to-air missiles, heavy machine guns, mortars, and satellite-positioning equipment. The Algerian security services seized a part of this arms in January 2004. ". Abderrazak el-Para was captured in Chad in 2004 and extradited to Algeria and Algerian courts sentenced him to death.[8]
In 2007, a group of French picnickers was killed. The gunmen were believed to be linked to al Qaeda's North Africa branch and the incident prompted organizers of the famous Dakar Rally to cancel the trans-Sahara car race.[9]
On February 22, 2008 , AQIM – kidnapped two Austrian citizens in Tunisia. The hostages were reportedly taken to Mali. and held there until released for a ransom. The AQIM first demanded the release of Abderrazak el-Para and other members imprisoned in Algeria. They then changed the request to include two Muslims imprisoned on terrorism charges in Austria. The hostages were finally released in October 2008, for ransom of $4 million paid by Vienna and the release of several jihadists held in Mauritania, including a veteran fighter named Oussama el-Merdaci.[10]
On December 14, 2008, two Canadian diplomats, UN special envoy to Niger, Robert Fowler, and his aide, Louis Guay, mysteriously disappeared while on a field trip. The fate of the two Canadians long remained shrouded in uncertainty. A Nigerian Tuareg rebel group first claimed responsibility for their abduction, but this claim was quickly retracted. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb released an online statement in which it claimed responsibility for the abduction of Fowler and Guay and other Europeans. [11]
On April 29, 2009 , Robert Fowler , Louis Guay, and a Swiss and German were released by AQIM in exchange of four jailed mujahedeen. All four had been jailed in Mali since February 2008. One of the released terrorist is an Algerian al-Qaeda member, Oussama Alboumerdassi, fought with the then U.S.-backed mujahedeen resistance to the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, staying on until 1992. Two of the other three terror suspects were Mauritanian, while the remaining one was either Jordanian or Syrian.[12]
At the heart of the negotiations seeking the release of the hostages were Saif al-Islam Muammar al-Gaddafi, son of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, and a relative of Burkina Faso President Blaise Compaore, identified as Mauritanian businessman Abdallah Chaffei.d. Saif al-Islam, who heads the Gaddafi Foundation charity, mediated in 2008 the case of two Austrians held by AQIM in Mali.[13]
Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper specifically thanked both Mali and Burkina Faso during a press conference in which he announced the Canadians' release. AQIM declared in an unofficial manner that " four of its members . . . have been delivered to the north of Mali as a result of a major transaction led by the Malian president," it said.[14]
The kidnappings of 2009
On January 4, 2009,a local criminal gang tried to kidnap a group of four Saudi tourists hunting birds in the desert region of Tillaberi in western Niger. The attack triggered a gun battle in which one Saudi Arabian was murdered and two other Saudis were wounded. The A-Sharq al-Awsat Arabic-language newspaper reported that the brigands wanted to sell them to Mokhtar Belmokhtar, an elusive al-Qaeda leader who operates in the region. Belmokhtar is associated with the Algeria-based al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.[15]
On April 22, 2009 , four Europeans (two Swiss, one German and a Briton), were kidnapped. The four Europeans were returning from the Anderamboukane festival on nomad culture in the border area between Mali and Niger when they were kidnapped. Their three-car convoy was ambushed; the first car got away and alerted the security forces, but the second and third cars, which were carrying the tourists, stayed on the spot and the people in them were kidnapped by Tuareg rebels who sold later their captives to the jihadists. The group has demanded the release of Jordanian militant leader Abu Qatada, held in Britain since 2005, and threatened to kill the Briton hostage Edwin Dyer if the demand went unmet. The Algerian media has reported that the jihadists had demanded $14 million for the hostages and also demanded the release of 20 of its men held in Mali.[16]
The Swiss and German women were freed in April 2009 , along with the two Canadian diplomats working for the United Nations, abducted in Niger on Dec. 14, 2008. The Swiss man was released in July 2009. The Briton Edwin Dyer was murdered by his kidnappers and was the first British kidnap victim executed by al-Qaeda outside Iraq. Gordon Brown, Britain's prime minister, condemned the killing as an "appalling and barbaric act of terrorism" and said it reinforced Britain's commitment to confront terrorism. "I want those who would use terror against British citizens to know beyond doubt that we and our allies will pursue them relentlessly, and that they will meet the justice they deserve."[17]
On June 25, 2009, AQIM took responsibility for the killing of an American aid worker in Mauritania's capital city of Nouakchott. The attack has been described as a botched kidnapping attempt.
Al-Jazeera TV said it had received an audio statement from al Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb in which the group said 39-year-old Christopher Ervin Leggett, an American aid worker, was killed for allegedly trying to convert Muslims to Christianity.
"Two knights of the Islamic Maghreb succeeded Tuesday morning at 8 a.m. to kill the infidel American Christopher Leggett for his Christianizing activities," the group said.
Mauritania's Interior Ministry said Thursday it was investigating the death and security forces were doing "all they can to catch the criminals."[18]
On November 25, 2009 the Frenchman Pierre Camatte was snatched from a hotel in Menaka in the Sahel region of northern Mali, more than 1,500 kilometers from the capital Bamako. In a message delivered in early January 2009, AQIM threatened to kill the French hostage if France and Mali did not meet the group’s demand for the release of four militants imprisoned by Mali’s authorities. The message included a call to the French public and the Camatte family to pressure French President Nicolas Sarkozy to accept their demands if they wanted the Frenchman to avoid the fate of English hostage Edwin Dyer.[19] On February 23, 2010, AQIM released Pierre Camatte. Camatte's release follows that of four Islamist prisoners by Mali.
Algeria and Mauritania, recalled their ambassadors to protest against the prisoner swap. Algerian media said two of the freed men were Algerian, and the Mauritanian government said one was Mauritanian. [20]
French President Nicolas Sarkozy, said in a statement that he was delighted that Camatte had been freed. He said he had thanked Malian President Amadou Toumani Toure for his handling of the crisis and pledged French support in the struggle against terrorism.[21]
On November 29,2009, three Spanish volunteers, two men and a women, (identified as Albert Vilalta, 35, Alicia Gamez, 35, and Roque Pascual, 50) were traveling in Mauritania in a convoy delivering humanitarian aid for the Spanish group Barcelona Accio Solidaria, when they were kidnapped .
AQIM claimed the kidnappings of a Frenchman and three Spaniards, seized in Mali and Mauritania, in an audio tape released on December 16, 2009 by Al-Jazeera television. In the audio tape Al Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb ( AQIM) spokesman, Saleh Abu Mohammad said:
"Two units of the valiant mujahedeen managed to kidnap four Europeans in two distinct operations,
The first in Mali where Frenchman Pierre Camatte was seized on November 25, and the second in Mauritania where three Spaniards were held on November 29. France and Spain will be informed later of the legitimate demands of the mujahedeen." [22]
On March 12, 2010, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb said in a statement posted on militant websites, that it released a Spanish woman it had held captive for 100 days in Mauritania because she voluntarily converted to Islam. AQIM said it also took into account health reasons in choosing to free Alicia Gamez. "The Spanish woman converted to Islam voluntarily after the mujahidin (fighters) exposed her to Islam and its teachings. She took the name of Aicha," the brief message said. The two male Spanish volunteers still being held captive by AQIM.[23]
On December 18, 2009, an Italian couple was kidnapped in southeastern Mauritania. 65-year-old Nicola Sergio Cicala and his wife, 39-year-old Philomen Kabouree (originally from Burkina Faso). They were kidnapped along the road from Aioun in Mauritania to Kayes in Mali. AQIM claimed responsibility for this kidnapping in two separate messages. The first message appeared on al-Arabiya TV, where a picture of the couple was shown with an audio message. The second message was posted on the Internet, where it clearly stated the kidnapping was linked to the role that Italy had in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and because of its support to the “crusade against Islam” (ANSA, December 31, 2009).[24]
AQIM had demanded in February that Mali's government free imprisoned militants before 1 March in exchange for the couple. Shortly before the deadline expired, Mr Cicala urged Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi to intervene in a purported audio message posted on the internet.
In April 2010 , the AQIM freed the couple and Local officials in Mali said Sergio Cicala and Philomene Kaboure were picked up by an army patrol in the eastern Gao region. Italy's foreign minister said they were "in the hands of Malian authorities" and were being taken to a "safe place". In Rome, Italian Foreign Minister Franco Frattini said the Italians' release had been the "fruit of intense diplomatic work that led authorities in Mali to take decisive actions to reach this solution". [25]
Criminal and terrorist cooperation in the abductions
The weakness of Sahelian states and the ineffective control of their territory have played a major role in the development of the current situation. Kidnappings have taken place in Tunisia, Mali, Niger and Mauritania, usually through local criminal gangs; hostages have then been moved to northern Mali, where a complex political and security scenario pitting local Tuareg tribes against the central government has allowed various terrorist groups to establish their own bases and training grounds .There are loose agreements between AQIM and a multiplicity of groups operating in the Sahel area :[26]
* The most famous of these is the "Moulathamoun group", headed by Belmokhtar (El Watan, August 1, 2007). Belmokhtar has had several disagreements with AQIM leader Abdelmalek Droukdel and acts in a semi-independent fashion. This uneasy collaboration was behind the kidnapping of the three Spanish aid workers who remained in the hands of al-Moulathamoun (AFP, 11 January 2010).
* The other main group in the area is the " Tareq ibn Ziyad", led by Yahia Abu Amar Abid Hammadou (a.k.a. Abdelhamid Abu Zeid), who created the group in AQIM’s 5th zone of operations (northeastern Algeria) in 2003 and subsequently moved to the Sahel area. Abu Zeid, who is allegedly responsible for the execution of British hostage Edwin Dyer, is also the leader of the Talaia al-Salafiya, Nasr Aflou and Muhajiroun groups.
The "Tareq Ibn Ziyad" branch currently holds kidnapped French national Pierre Camatte. In addition, the Italian couple is in the hands of Abu Yaya Amane, a lieutenant of Yahia Abu Amar who is probably trying to exploit this abduction to mark his own territory in the Sahel region and gain operational independence from the other two groups in the area .
Summary
Statistics kept by regional security services for 2007 show that 115 people, mostly businessmen, were abducted by Islamist groups with billions of dinars paid in ransoms.[27] It seems that AQIM is following Al-Qaeda in Iraq's modus operandi, after having imported suicide bombings to Algeria (mostly since the April 11, 2007 attacks), then recruiting teenagers, now AQIM is kidnapping foreign nationals.[28]
AQIM has claimed responsibility for most of the kidnappings across the region over the past few years. In most cases, the jihadists make political demands as well as ransoms that run into millions of dollars. The abductions since 2008 illustrate AQIM’s extended geographical reach (Tunisian, Algeria, Mali Niger). Whether the AQIM presence is direct or indirect, it has significant operational implications.
The number of kidnappings has risen since December 2008 and there are several reasons for this:
* AQIM has intensified its presence in Mauritania, Algeria, Mali,Niger and in the whole Sahel region.
* The weakness of these states and their ineffective control of the area. The security services in Mauritania, Mali and Niger do not have the equipment and the ability to fight in efficient way AQIM and other insurgents and the liberation of hostages by military means is really difficult.
* Most ransoms are paid, although governments rarely admit this is so.
AQIM's growing presence in the Sahel region and the increasing number of abductions of European tourists in Mauritania, Niger, Tunisia and Mali show that a profitable kidnapping industry has led to an increase in terrorism activity in this region. AQIM's activities were previously based along Algeria's Mediterranean coast, but security crackdowns by the Algerian military have forced the group into the largely ungoverned Sahara desert area of Mali, and along Algeria's northern border. Owing to the weakness of these states and their ineffective control of the area, AQIM militants are free to move across borders and to establish their bases in the region. This situation enables AQIM to combine its ideological goals with a series of tactical advantages. AQIM relies on local communities of the Sahara for sanctuary. This lucrative business profits local criminal gangs, which have become almost natural allies of AQIM in the region. [29]
AQIM's flexible structure in the region has led to a win-win situation where a profitable kidnapping network benefits local criminal groups, local AQIM-affiliated groups and the AQIM leadership. In this context, local criminals carry out the abductions and then sell the hostages to AQIM-affiliated groups for a profit; however, the terrorist groups then earn the highest profit, as they bear the highest risk and can extort a ransom from European governments fearful that the failure of negotiations could lead to the death of hostages, as in the Edwin Dyer case (Liberation [Paris], December 9, 2009).[30]
AQIM attacks on foreigners can be expected to grow as western companies increase investment in oil and gas exploration in the region. As long as the European states continue paying the ransom money, AQIM and it's allies in the Sahel will continue with the campaign of kidnappings. Last September, ( 2009), Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika pleaded before the United Nations General Assembly for a ban on paying ransoms to kidnappers, which he said had reached" worrying proportions."[31] Only an international comprehensive campaign that include:
Military operations against the AQIM infrastructure in the region.
Economic and military support to the local " weak" states ( Mauritania, Niger, Mali).
Decision not to surrender to the demands of the terrorist as a strategy.
Can lead in the long term to the reduction of kidnappings in the Sahel region and the defeat of the AQIM.
In April 2010 Four Sahara desert nations: Algeria, Mali, Mauritania and Niger are opening a joint military headquarters to coordinate their efforts against AQIM.
The new joint headquarters will be based in Tamanrasset, in southern Algeria.
The countries will strengthen intelligence cooperation, and plan to move toward joint military operations against terrorism, kidnappings, and the trafficking of drugs and weapons.[32]
Notes:
[1]Al Qaeda Organization in the Maghreb,Wikipedia.
Algerian group backs al-Qaeda2 BBC News, 23 October 2003
[3]Al Qaeda Organization in the Maghreb,Wikipedia.
[4]Al-Qaida joins Algerians against France", AP, 14 September 2006
[5]Interview of Abu Musab Abdul Wadoud with New York Times, July 2008.
[6] "Call for help from the Islamic Maghreb", published in Alsharq Alawsat.
[7] Olivier Guitta, AQIM new kidnappings strategy, Middle East Times, March 23, 2008.
[8] Staff writers ,Jihadist kidnappers plague North Africa, Algeria, UPI ,January 4, 2009.
[9] Al Qaeda claims slaying of U.S aid worker, CBSNEWS ,June 25, 2009.
[10] Ibid
[11] Hana Rogan, New AQIM abduction cases, Jihadica, February 24 ,2009.
[12] Niger kidnapping: mujahedeen fighters released in exchange for diplomats, Niger Watch, April 29,2009.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Staff writers ,Jihadist kidnappers plague North Africa, Algeria, UPI ,January 4, 2009.
[16] Hana Rogan, New AQIM abduction cases, Jihadica, February 24 ,2009.
[17]Staff writers ,Jihadist kidnappers plague North Africa, Algeria, UPI ,January 4, 2009
[18] Al Jazeera: Al Qaeda claims to have killed American aid worker in Mauritania, June 25, 2009.
[19] Radio France Internationale [RFI], January 11, 2010.
[20] Al Qaeda released Frenchman in prisoners swap, Alertnet, February 23, 2010.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Mark Tran, Three Spanish aid workers kidnapped in Mauritania, guardian.co.uk, November 30,2009.
[23]:"Spanish hostage converted to Islam'", Cairo (AP),March 12, 2010.
[24] Dario Cristiani, Riccardo Fabiani, AQIM funds terrorist operations with thriving Sahel- based kidnapping industry, Terrorism Monitor, volume 8 issue 4 , January 28, 2009.
[25] Al qaeda frees two Italian hostages in Mali: AFP,April 16,2010.
[26] Dario Cristiani, Riccardo Fabiani, AQIM funds terrorist operations with thriving Sahel- based kidnapping industry, Terrorism Monitor, volume 8 issue 4 , January 28, 2009.
[27] Staff writers ,Jihadist kidnappers plague North Africa, Algeria, UPI ,January 4, 2009.
[28] Olivier Guitta, AQIM new kidnappings strategy, Middle East Times, March 23, 2008.
[29] Dario Cristiani, Riccardo Fabiani, AQIM funds terrorist operations with thriving Sahel- based kidnapping industry, Terrorism Monitor, volume 8 issue 4 , January 28, 2009.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Kidnapping is lucrative for Al Qaeda in North Africa, AFP ,Dakar ,December 1, 2009.
[32] Four Saharan nations established joint anti terror command, VOA News.com, April 21, 2010.
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